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IDENTIFYING INTENSE PREFERENCES
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamirf
People's preferences vary in intensity: some are strong while others are
weak. Information regarding the strength of preferences is essential to legal
policymaking for reasons of both efficiency and fairness. The goal of effi-
ciency maximization requires allocating goods to those who value them most;
it seems unfair to grant an entitlement to a person who is comparatively
indifferent to receiving it rather than to one who intensely desires it. How-
ever, identifying strong preferences is no easy task. Individuals may strategi-
cally misrepresent the intensity of their preferences to improve their position.
In recent years, the law-and-economics literature has largely focused on one
aspect of this issue: the case of owners'subjectively high valuation of land.
Several scholars have proposed various techniques, which rely on self-assess-
ments, to detect people's true preferences. These techniques require case-by-
case inquiries, involve monetary payments, and employ sanctions to ensure
truthfulness.
This Article argues that the land-valuation problem is but a specific
manifestation of a much broader concern. The need to identify intense pref-
erences arises in all fields of law, and with respect to all types of entitlements.
More importantly, fundamentally different methods can be used to detect
strong preferences. Identifiers may be generalized rather than case specfic,
entail in-kind burdens rather than monetary ones, and adopt nonpenalizing
rather than penalizing approaches.
Legal rules, as this Article demonstrates, can employ generalized and
nonpenalizing (GNP) devices to identify intense preferences. Such identfiers
include use value vs. exchange value, possession, declining marginal utility,
redemption, and reasons-requirement. These identfiers tacitly underlie a va-
riety of rules governing such dive e issues as rights of first refusal. takings
compensation, self-help remedies, children's adoption, secured transactions,
and conscientious objection.
The Article further argues that GNP identfiers are superior to alterna-
tive techniques. It compares GNP devices to four other methods: "Mouth"
(reliance on people's verbal statements alone); "Mouth and Purse" (verbal
statements backed up by monetary sanctions); "Generalized and Penalizing"
(generalizations that utilize willingness to bear in-kind sanctions); and
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"Case-Specfic and Penalizing" (case-by-case detection via readiness to incur
nonmonetaiy burdens). GNP techniques score highly on all parameters of
evaluation. They treat people with dignity and respect, afford equal treat-
ment to their preferences, do not favor the rich, and at the same time, miti-
gate the risk of lies. In addition, GNP methods entail relatively low
administrative costs and can contend with objectionable preference-
intensities.
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INTRODUCTION
Young Arthur's accession to the throne is a well-known and be-
loved tale. Following the death of King Uther Pendragon, many pow-
erful nobles believed themselves deserving of the crown, and Britain
was in danger of being thrown into turmoil.' Bloodshed, however,
was averted when a miraculous stone appeared with a sword thrust
deep into it, bearing the inscription: "'WHOSO PULLETH OUT THIS
SWORD OF THIS STONE AND ANVIL IS RIGHTWISE KING BORN OF ALL EN-
GLAND.'"2 All the mightiest knights failed in the attempt to unsheathe
the sword.3 Only Arthur, a mere boy, effortlessly drew the sword from
1 SIR THOMAS MALORY, KING ARTHUR AND His KNIGHTS 8 (Eugene Vinaver ed., 1980)
("Then stood the realm in great jeopardy long while, for every lord that was mighty of men
made him strong, and many weened to have been king.").
2 Id. at9.
3 ROBERT DE BORON, MERLIN AND THE GRAIL 107-09 (Nigel Bryant trans., 2001).
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the stone, 4 thus revealing himself as the true King.5 In this legendary
history, the sword test, rather than force, wealth, or inheritance was
used to identify the rightful sovereign.
The Arthurian legend, as fables are wont to do, illustrates a com-
mon, real-life problem: how to identify truth. In the legal context,
this difficulty regularly arises when we seek to identify and determine
the true strength of people's preferences. Often, there is more than
one path to arrive at this goal, which raises the question of the most
appropriate method. Should we gauge preference-intensity by verbal
statements, monetary payments, willingness to bear sanctions, or some
other means? This Article addresses that question.
People hold a multitude of preferences that vary in intensity.6
Some are relatively strong, while others are comparatively weak. For
instance, although both Guinevere and Lancelot rank vanilla above
chocolate ice cream, Guinevere may have only a slight preference for
one flavor over the other, while Lancelot may extremely dislike choco-
late and greatly favor vanilla.7 Consequently, a move up the prefer-
ence-satisfaction ladder from chocolate to vanilla would substantially
enhance Lancelot's welfare. A similar change would have only a small
positive effect on Guinevere's well-being.
Information regarding the strength-rather than just the con-
tent-of preferences is often essential for both efficiency and fair-
4 MALORY, supra note 1, at 10-11.
5 ANDREA HOPKINS, CHRONICLES OF KING ARTHUR 22 (1993) ("The Sword in the
Stone can only be drawn by the true king, and is thus instrumental in bringing Arthur to
his throne.").
6 See, e.g.,JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THF CALCULUS OF CONSENT: Loc.
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 125 (1962) (arguing, in the context of
voting, that people's preferences "vary in both object and intensity"); Alan Coddington,
Utilitarianism Today, 4 POL. THEORY 213, 221 (1976) ("Of course, we do have stronger and
weaker preferences .... ). This Article does not address the debate on whether individu-
als have a single, complete, and transitive set of preferences, or rather dual and even multi-
ple preference orderings. On this issue, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer
Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998).
7 An "ordinal" ranking of preferences represents the order of an individual's prefer-
ences. Any numbers used in such ranking indicate only the sequence of preferences and
do not convey information about the strength of preferences. In a "cardinal" ranking, by
contrast, there is meaning to the differences between the numbers attached to rankings.
The distances between the ranked preferences designate the intensity with which one alter-
native is preferred to the other. HANS VAN DEN DOEL & BEN VAN VELTHOVEN, DEMOCRACY
AND WELFARE ECONOMICS 23-24 (2d. ed. 1993) (generally explaining the concepts of ordi-
nal and cardinal methods of measurements); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being,
and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 76-78 (1990) (discussing ordinality and cardinality
in the context of voting). In the above example, Guinevere and Lancelot have identical
ordinal rankings. Only a cardinal ranking reveals the wide gap between Lancelot's prefer-
ences for vanilla and chocolate ice creams, and Guinevere's merely mild preference for
one flavor over the other.
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ness.8 The goal of efficiency maximization requires allocating goods
to those who value them most.9 Accordingly, when regulators,judges,
or other decisionmakers allocate entitlements among competing par-
ties-be it property, babies for adoption, or seminar paper topics-
they need to compare the intensity of the preferences for these enti-
tlements.10 Fairness considerations likewise necessitate such an in-
quiry. Absent good justifications to the contrary, it seems unfair to
grant an entitlement to a person who is comparatively indifferent to
receiving it rather than to one who intensely desires it. I Moreover,
even when no direct competition over a resource is involved, ignoring
the possibility of intense preferences might lead to inefficient and un-
just results. Rules that are perfectly suitable for cases of "ordinary" or
average preference-intensity may be inappropriate for situations
where exceptionally strong preferences exist. By identifying the latter
situations and according them different treatment, we improve the
efficiency and fairness of legal rules. For instance, market value may
be a reasonable compensation measure for most owners of lost or
damaged property. Yet, it will systematically undercompensate owners
with unique, subjective valuations of their property, causing demorali-
zation and inefficiency in the long-run. 12 For all these reasons, we
frequently engage in judgments and comparisons of preference-
intensities.
Identifying intense preferences is clearly crucial when a market
for the relevant entitlement does not exist, 13 or when there is a signifi-
8 See Richard J. Arneson, Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for
Welfare, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 158, 181 (1990) ("The value of satisfying one or another of an
individual's preferences depends on its relative importance as judged by the individual
herself.").
9 Economic analysis of law adopted the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-15 (7th ed. 2007); DAVID L. WEIMER &
AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 263-64 (2d ed. 1992). Accord-
ingly, a certain change is efficient if those gaining from it could fully compensate the losers
and still be better-off. It suffices that an excess of benefits over losses exists; efficiency does
not require actual compensation of the losers. ALLAN M. FELDMAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS
AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 142-44 (1980) (discussing the Kaldor-Hicks criterion). The
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is a cardinal measure since it uses the surrogate of money to com-
pare utility or welfare across individuals. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 93 (stating that
"Kaldor-Hicks assessments of efficiency... permit cardinal comparisons").
10 I do not claim that promoting preference satisfaction in society should be the
state's only goal. For the purposes of this Article, it suffices that enhancing people's prefer-
ence satisfaction is justifiably an important governmental concern.
11 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 92 (1956) (noting this issue of
fairness in relation to an intense minority and an apathetic majority in politics).
12 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by Planning Au-
thorities: Towards a Comprehensive Theory, 46 U. TOROTrrO L.J. 47, 61-62, 65-66 (1996). For
discussion of this example, see infra Part I.
13 A good example is an entitlement to conscientious-objector status, which exempts a
person from military service. See infra Part II.E.
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cant risk of market failure.1 4 In such cases, we cannot rest assured
that voluntary transactions would eventually transfer goods to those
who desire them most. Identification is also important, however, in
circumstances where functioning markets exist. Rules directly ad-
dressing the needs of individuals with strong preferences can econo-
mize on transaction costs and increase the resultant efficiency gains,
while at the same time avoiding the market's inherent bias against
those unable to pay. 15
Detecting intense preferences is a difficult task. For example,
people asked to verbally state the strength of their preferences may lie
in order to improve their position. 16 The law-and-economics litera-
ture has largely focused on a narrow-though important-aspect of
this identification issue. It has devoted much attention to the case of
owners' subjectively high valuation of land, primarily in the context of
compensation for takings. 17 This literature proposes identification
techniques that rely on self-assessments by the affected owners and
can be characterized by three features: they require case-by-case in-
quires, involve monetary payments, and employ sanctions to ensure peo-
ple's truthfulness.' 8 Such sanctions may include, for example, basing
property taxes on owners' self-valuations.' 9
This Article argues that the land-valuation problem is but a spe-
cific manifestation of a much broader concern. The need to identify
intense preferences may arise in all fields of law and with respect to all
14 The market might fail to satisfy individuals' highest-ranking preferences due, for
example, to a prisoner's dilemma type of situation. G. PETER PENZ, CONSUMER SOVER-
EIGNTY AND HUMAN INTERESTS 37-38 (1986); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 6, at 386-88,
391-94.
15 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8
HOFSTR.A L. REv. 671, 677-84 (1980) (explaininig that willingness to pay depends on ability
to pay and hence favors the wealthy over the poor).
16 See VAN DEN DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 7, at 22 ("[Rlesults can be less
reliable because the respondents have no economic incentive to reveal their true prefer-
ences."); see a/soJULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORA.S AND THE LAW 91 (1988) ("In the
absence of a market in which a person's willingness to pay is expressed through trades and
bids, the cost of ascertaining willingness to pay would be enormous and the reliability of
that information suspect."); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRON-
TATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 99 (1982)
(noting that consideration of preference-intensity "might lead people to exaggerate their
desires simply to make them count for more").
17 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59
STAN. L. RaV. 871 (2007). Another discrete context in which the identification of strong
preferences was discussed is voting. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 131-69
(demonstrating how vote trading and logrolling enable the consideration of preference-
intensities); Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 111, 142-61 (2000) (advo-
cating a limited vote market that would reflect the strength of voting preferences). The
logrolling method is discussed infra Part Il.
18 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 890-900 (suggesting a self-assess-
ment model with these features).
19 Id. at 892-94.
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types of entitlement. More importantly, additional and fundamentally
different methods can be used to discover strong preferences; identifi-
ers can be generalized rather than case specific, thus dispensing with
the need for ad-hoc examination of individual cases. That is to say, we
can generalize about circumstances in which intense preferences are
likely to exist and incorporate the relevant proxies-such as "use
value" or "declining marginal utility"-into the legal rules themselves.
Furthermore, identifiers may entail burdens in-kind rather than mone-
tary costs, thereby reducing the bias in favor of the rich. Thus, instead
of detecting strong preferences via individuals' willingness to pay, we
may reveal them through their readiness to sacrifice time, effort, or
honor. Finally, identifiers may adopt nonpenalizing-rather than pe-
nalizing-approaches. Sometimes, we can detect intense preferences
without taxing the subjective, unique utility that some people derive
from entitlements. Individuals need not hand over some (or all) of
this special value as proof that strong preferences indeed exist.
The goal of this Article is twofold. First, it demonstrates how le-
gal rules can-and do-employ generalized and nonpenalizing
("GNP") devices to identify intense preferences. This type of identi-
fier has not received systematic theoretical treatment and has not
been sufficiently utilized in practice. Prime examples of nonpenaliz-
ing proxies for strong preferences are use value vs. exchange value,
possession, declining marginal utility, redemption, and reasons-re-
quirement.20 These proxies can be found in diverse legal fields and
contexts. They constitute a hidden common denominator of such dis-
similar rules as those governing rights of first refusal, takings compen-
sation, self-help remedies, adoption, bankruptcy exemptions, secured
transactions, and conscientious objection. Current law has not ex-
hausted the potential for crafting GNP identifiers, which leaves room
to adopt additional rules of this kind.
Second, the Article argues that GNP identifiers enjoy various ad-
vantages that other techniques for detecting strong preferences lack
(either wholly or in part). The Article compares GNP devices to four
alternative methods: "Mouth" (reliance on verbal statements alone, as
in public opinion polls and contingent valuation surveys); "Mouth
and Purse" (identification through verbal statements backed up by
monetary sanctions, as employed in self-assessment mechanisms for
land valuation); "Generalized and Penalizing" (generalizations re-
garding cases of strong preferences, which utilize people's readiness
to bear in-kind sanctions); and "Case-Specific and Penalizing" (case-
by-case detection of intense preferences through individuals' willing-
ness to incur nonmonetary burdens). As this Article will demonstrate,
20 See infra Parts II.A-II.E.
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the GNP technique is, overall, the superior method because it is the
only one that scores highly on all parameters of evaluation. GNP
identifiers treat people with dignity and respect, afford equal treat-
ment to their preferences, do not favor the wealthy, and at the same
time mitigate the risk of lies. In addition, the GNP method entails
relatively low administrative costs and is capable of dealing with objec-
tionable preference-intensities. The other four methods fail on more
than one of these grounds. The role that GNP identifiers play should
thus be expanded and rules utilizing them adopted whenever feasible.
Some important clarifications are in order. The Article focuses
on identifying the strength of people's subjective, actual preferences.21
Although such preferences may sometimes be irrational or offensive,
even objective theories of welfare afford them substantial-albeit not
conclusive-weight. 22 Thus, all theories of well-being share in the
quest for detecting intense preferences. Later in the Article, I shall
somewhat broaden the perspective by addressing the problem of indi-
viduals with unfair or objectionable preference-intensities. 23 Further-
more, for the purposes of this Article, one need not dwell on the
distinction between people's preferences and their value judgments. 24
To the extent that decisionmakers need to gauge the strength with
which values are held, we can extend our discussion of preference-
intensity-identification to people's mental states regarding their
values.25
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I opens with the technique
enjoying the greatest popularity in legal literature, namely, "Mouth
and Purse" identifiers. It exposes their shortcomings and establishes
the need for identification methods that are not prone to similar
problems. Part II discusses several generalized and nonpenalizing
identificrs of strongly held preferences. This Part demonstrates the
great potential of GNP techniques and their applicability to numerous
21 For a critical discussion of subjective and objective theories of welfare, see generally
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669 (2003).
22 See id. at 1677-1700, 1710-13 (discussing ways of dealing with mistaken or objec-
tionable actual preferences and explaining their place in objective theories of well-being).
23 See infra Part III.E.
24 See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 ETHIcs 301 (1986) (drawing a distinc-
tion between values and preferences and claiming that public policy should be based on
communitarian values, rather than on individuals' preferences); Joseph William Singer,
Critical Normativity, 20 LAw & CRITIQUE 27 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1278154 (arguing that values are not the same as preferences and that the former
should be employed in rejecting illegitimate preferences from our moral calculus).
25 Take, for example, the issue of conscientious objection. If the state is willing to
exempt objectors from military service, it must identify those individuals who would suffer
the severest injury to their conscience if forced to bear arms. The methods discussed infra
Part II.E with respect to identifying strong preferences against military service are equally
applicable to the detection of intensely held values in this regard.
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issues in various legal fields. Part III elaborates on the many theoreti-
cal advantages of GNP identifiers, contrasting them with the relative
disadvantages of four alternative methods. Thus, it substantiates the
normative superiority of the generalized and nonpenalizing ap-
proach. The conclusion points to further theoretical implications of
our analysis, including its extension to identification of low-intensity
preferences.
I
OVERCOMING SECRETS AND LIES THROUGH "MOUTH AND
PURSE" TECHNIQUES
When courts and other decisionmakers wish to gauge the
strength of people's preferences in a specific case, they face two obsta-
cles: secrets and lies. The first obstacle refers to the difficulty of dis-
covering private information about the intensity of preferences; such
information is not reflected in observable behavior. The easy solu-
tion-asking people to verbally reveal the crucial information-imme-
diately encounters the second obstacle: the incentive to lie.26
Competition and compensation scenarios may encourage individuals
to overstate their valuation. This is the case when the state must allo-
cate a scarce entitlement between one of two (or more) parties, such
as for adopting a healthy baby, and when the state is obliged to com-
pensate owners for the expropriation of their land. Exaggerated as-
sessments in both cases increase, respectively, the chance of receiving
the entitlement or the ensuing monetary award.2 7 In contrast, self-
assessments for taxation purposes potentially prompt understatements
of value in an attempt to reduce subsequent payments to the govern-
ment.28 Thus, the advantage of simplicity in acquiring the informa-
tion is offset by the shortcoming of its dubious authenticity.
Consequently, writers have expended much energy in devising and
perfecting complex lie-proof mechanisms. This literature has largely
focused on the valuation of land 29-the quintessential asset often val-
26 See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1399, 1411 (2005) ("The
primary stumbling block to obtaining a truthful valuation statement is a party's knowledge
of the way the valuation will affect her fortunes.").
27 See id. at 1419 (discussing how parties tailor valuations to maximize value); see also
Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1479 (2008)
("Because eminent domain has no reliable mechanism for eliciting the true valuation of
landowners, any consideration of subjective valuation would be an invitation to perjury.").
28 See Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REv.
771, 778 (1982) ("In asking an owner to volunteer information about what his property is
worth to him, we face an obvious problem that is at the core of any self-assessment system:
unless constrained, an owner will underassess or, more accurately, selfishly announce a
dishonest assessment.").
29 See Fennell, supra note 26, at 1444-81 (devising self-assessed valuation mechanisms
for a variety of multiparty commons situations, including aesthetic controls in neighbor-
1398 [Vol. 94:1391
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ued by its owner above market price30 -and, in particular, on the as-
sessment of compensation for its taking by the state. 3 1 It was
proposed, for instance, that compensation be determined according
to owners' self-valuations (declared either in advance, before any con-
flict has arisen,32 or after the government considers expropriation of
the property) 33. Such devices as basing property taxes on self-assess-
ments34 and requiring future sale prices to at least equal self-declared
values would achieve truthfulness. 35 Alternatively, owners selling their
property below their former evaluation would have to pay the differ-
ence to the government or to their favored charity.3 6
hoods and conservation easements); Daniel M. Holland & William M. Vaughn, An Evalua-
tion of Self-Assessment Under a Property Tax, in THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 79
(Arthur D. Lynn, Jr. ed., 1969) (examining various self-assessment schemes for land taxa-
tion); Levmore, supra note 28, at 771, 778-90 (proposing self-assessed valuation in the
context of the property tax); see also Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement,
49 Am. U. L. REV. 327, 364-73 (1999) (discussing several self-assessment mechanisms sug-
gested in the literature).
30 See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 173-74 (2002) (list-
ing psychological attachment, customization, and location benefits among the reasons real
property is often valued above market price); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public
Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 859, 866 ("[Sellers] are not compensated for ... loss of
consumer surplus-which is to say the amount by which an owner values property over and
above its fair market value.").
31 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 891-900 (discussing the advantages of
self-assessment mechanisms for takings compensation); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent
Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 995-1002 (advocating eliciting advance consent
for certain takings by allowing self-assessed compensation and providing tax benefits);
Thomas S. Ulen, The Public Use of Private Property: A Dual-Constraint Theory of Efficient Govern-
mental Takings, in TAKING PROPERTY ANDJUST COMPENSATION: LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPEC-
TIVES OF THE TAKINGS ISSUE 163, 182-83 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1992) (evaluating a
proposal under which owners' self-assessments of the value of their land would determine
their taxation liability and eminent-domain compensation).
32 See Fennell, supra note 31, at 995-99.
33 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 892-93.
34 See id. at 892-94. Self-assessments can be used as the basis for taxation if they are
reported before any question of expropriation arises, or if the government eventually de-
cides not to take the property. In order to reduce the government's incentive to exces-
sively exercise its eminent domain power, Bell and Parchomovsky suggest that while owners
will indeed increase their payments based on their above-market self-assessments, they will
pay the additional increment of property tax to a charity of their choice rather than to the
government. Id. at 894, 901.
35 Id. at 892-93.
36 Id. at 893, 901. Saul Levmore has proposed that property taxation be based on
owners' self-assessments. Levmore, supra note 28, at 779, 789. The risk of undervaluation
would be mitigated by periodically publicizing these assessments and allowing anyone (in-
cluding the government) wishing to force a sale of the property against payment of the
self-reported value to do so. Holland and Vaughn examined variations on such a taxation
scheme, where bids in forced sales must exceed landowners' valuations by twenty percent,
and owners can retain their property by revaluing it according to the buyer's offer, or by
raising their self-assessment by twenty-five percent. Holland & Vaughn, supra note 29, at
81-83, 89-110. In a similar vein, Fennell has suggested that owners allowing the taking of
their property for government-sponsored private condemnations choose a price between
one hundred percent and two hundred percent of the regulatory-assessed value. Fennell,
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These identifiers of intense preferences can be characterized as
ad-hoc "Mouth and Purse" (MP) techniques. MP techniques ascertain
strong preferences on a case-by-case basis via personal statements of
value backed by monetary payments. Willingness to pay higher taxes
and refusal to sell below stated values serve as proof of genuinely in-
tense preferences with respect to the asset. The monetary sanction on
sales below self-declared values also curbs owners' incentives to lie. 37
MP techniques may indeed discourage owners from intentionally
lying about their valuation of entitlements.3 8 This advantage, how-
ever, comes at a heavy price.39 MP mechanisms employ actual mone-
tary payments both to prove the existence of intense preferences and
to deter untruthfulness. The use of a "willingness to pay" standard
exposes MP to critiques similar to those leveled at the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion of efficiency.40 People's willingness to pay depends, at least
partially, on their ability to pay, and thus on the existing distribution
of wealth in society. 41 Nonaffluent owners may be unable to pay
higher taxes that reflect their true, above-market valuation of the
property.42 Furthermore, the declining marginal utility of money im-
plies that the less well-off a person is, the greater the detrimental im-
pact of the fine on future sales below self-declared values. Because
individuals are generally risk averse, 43 nonwealthy owners may under-
supra note 31, at 997-98. Volunteering owners would receive a tax rebate but, in order to
discourage overvaluation, its size will be inversely related to the percentage that self-as-
sessed value exceeds governmental-assessed value. Owners who self-report 200% would
not receive any tax break. Id.
37 Note that even MP mechanisms do not entirely eliminate incentives to lie. See, e.g.,
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 897-98 (explaining, with respect to takings com-
pensation, why owners not wishing to sell in the foreseeable future have an incentive to
overstate their valuation); Levmore, supra note 28, at 781-82 (observing, in the context of
property taxation, that owners may report a value that is lower than their true reservation
price, yet still higher than their estimation of the price anyone else would be willing to pay
for the property).
38 For a critique of the "lie-mitigation" advantage of MP methods, see infra Part III.B.
39 For a detailed discussion of the several advantages of generalized and nonmonetary
identifiers of intense preferences, see infra Part III.
40 See sources cited supra note 16.
41 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAcic CHOICES 32 (1978) (stating that an
important problem of market determination of scarce goods' allocation is its "dependence
on the existing distribution of wealth"); Robert E. Goodin, How to Determine Who Should Get
What, 85 ETHICS 310, 315 (1975) (noting that an individual's willingness to pay "depends
heavily on how much he can afford to pay").
42 Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure ofJust Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 239,
272 n.ll0 (2007).
43 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcs 51-52 (4th ed. 2004) (ex-
plaining that an attitude of risk aversion-rather than risk neutrality-is the standard eco-
nomic presumption with respect to individuals); POSNER, supra note 9, at 11
("[E]conomists believe . . . that most people are risk averse most of the time .. . ").
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state the value of their property in order to avoid the potential
sanction. 44
Even leaving aside regressivity and wealth effects, MP methods
seem unfair and discriminatory. People are not ordinarily compelled
to reveal the full extent of their valuation of a good. Market prices
reflect the value of the marginal owner, which allows individuals to
keep their consumer surplus-both literally and metaphorically-to
themselves. 45 Employing MP devices is advocated only in limited cir-
cumstances. Accordingly, owners whose land is considered for expro-
priation will pay higher taxes than owners who do not face a threat of
eminent domain. 46 Consequently, MP singles out some persons with
intense preferences for differential treatment, and taxes their unique,
subjective value.47 Finally, implementing MP methods is complex and
raises the administrative costs of resource-valuation processes. For in-
stance, the requirement that land not be sold for less than its self-
declared value necessitates stringent monitoring of real estate transac-
tions and collection of any discrepancies between stated values and
(lower) sale prices.48
44 SeenAmnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704,
1730-31 (2007) (contrasting the risk aversion of individuals whose land is their main asset
with the risk-spreading advantages of land speculators who have multiple holdings). A
different question is whether people would be able to accurately quantify their subjective
valuation of an asset when they do not contemplate selling it on the real market. Else-
where I have argued that behavioral studies support the claim that people's truthful reser-
vation price (WTA) is not fixed. In particular, reservation prices are expected to be higher
for coerced transfers than for voluntary sales. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between
Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 219, 253-57 (2001).
45 See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text; see also DANA & MERRILL, supra note
30, at 174 (stating that fair market value reflects the value of the marginal owner and that
many owners are "infra-marginal").
46 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 895 (admitting that their self-assessment
proposal cannot apply to land owned by tax-exempt organizations and to personal prop-
erty that is not periodically taxed according to its value).
47 For a brief mention of the horizontal equity problem', see Wyman, supra note 42, at
266 n.96. Similarly, although Fennell's tax-break mechanism discourages exaggerated self-
assessments (since the higher the self-reported value, the lower the tax rebate), it also
penalizes owners with genuinely high valuations. Such owners are required to forgo some-
or even all-of the economic benefits that individuals without intense preferences receive.
Fennell, supra note 31. Some scholars advocating MP mechanisms are aware of this diffi-
culty. Levmore, for example, acknowledges the problem that owners with idiosyncratic
tastes would face a heavier tax burden and suggests mitigating it by introducing a more
complex system of competitive assessment. See Levmore, supra note 28, at 780-81, 783-88;
see also Fennell, supra note 26, at 1469-70 (observing that self-assessments require payment
of the entitlement's full value to the assessor, leaving no surplus in her hands, but remain-
ing agnostic about the fairness of this outcome).
48 See Lehavi & Licht, supra note 44, at 1730; Wyman, supra note 42, at 266; see also
Holland & Vaughn, supra note 29, at 85 ("[E]ven with a relatively modest fraction of
properties requiring sanctions [for misrepresentation of value by owners], the strain on
financial and marketing resources could become prohibitive."); Ulen, supra note 31, at 183
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The shortcomings of MP techniques highlight the need for addi-
tional and different identifiers of strong preferences. Ideally, we
should seek identifiers that do not penalize people with intense pref-
erences, are not biased against those worse off, and do not entail high
administrative costs. Furthermore, asking individuals to evaluate enti-
tlements, and then using monetary threats that impliedly assume that
they do not tell the truth, is disrespectful of people's honesty and in-
tegrity. It is more respectful of individuals either to accept their esti-
mations at face value and take them into consideration, 49 or forgo
reliance on verbal accounts altogether.
Nonpenalizing identifiers exist and are quite prevalent in various
legal contexts. Indeed, they are also found in the sphere of takings
compensation.50 However, the functional similarity of these identifi-
ers has been heretofore overlooked due to the diversity of contexts in
which they are used and their unsystematic employment. Nonpenaliz-
ing devices detect intense preferences by using several proxies.
Mostly, they generalize about circumstances in which strong prefer-
ences are likely to exist and incorporate the relevant proxies-such as
"use value," "possession," and "declining marginal utility"-into the
legal rules. 51 Nonpenalizing identifiers base these generalizations on
experience or studies of human nature and behavior. Alternatively,
legal rules sometimes adopt identifiers that, while case-specific rather
than general, do not require monetary payments or impose sanctions
on people with intense preferences.52
I do not claim that MP mechanisms should never be used or that
GNP identifiers can invariably replace verbal and monetary tech-
niques for detecting intense preferences. I do submit, however, that
nonpenalizing identifiers are often superior to alternative identifica-
tion methods, should be more widely used, and merit close theoretical
attention. Let us now turn to examine such devices.
II
GENERALIZED AND NONPENALIZING IDENTIFIERS OF
INTENSE PREFERENCES
GNP identifiers of intense preferences may take various forms.
The following examples were chosen with an eye for variety. Though
(observing that allowing landowners to change self-assessments frequently would create
"overly burdensome administrative costs").
49 For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 241, 250-55 and accompanying
text.
50 See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
51 See infra Parts I.A-II.C.
52 A prime example is requiring "reasons" for preferences. See infra Part II.E.
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certainly not exhaustive, they demonstrate the richness of possibilities
in this context.
A. Use Value vs. Exchange Value
One proxy for identifying strong preferences is the distinction-
supported by behavioral studies-between assets held for use and as-
sets intended for exchange. Generally speaking, preferences regard-
ing property are likely to be more intense when an individual holds it
for her own (and continuous) use than when she holds the property
for exchange or when she subsequently chooses to part with it, for
instance, by sale. A person wishing to trade is a person who intends to
participate in the market and who believes that good substitutes for
her property exist-otherwise she would not have agreed to sell. In
other words, willingness to exchange means that the market price sat-
isfactorily compensates for the asset.53 In contrast, an individual who
wishes to continue using her property refuses to enter the market.
This is tantamount to a belief that adequate alternatives-in the form
of money or other goods-do not exist.
Experimental studies of the endowment effect (EE) confirm the
disparity between use value and exchange value. Numerous experi-
ments have shown that people value an entitlement they already pos-
sess much more than a similar entitlement they have an opportunity
to acquire. 5 4 Specifically, individuals demand a significantly higher
price to relinquish an already-owned entitlement than they would be
willing to pay in order to purchase the same entitlement. The diver-
gence between the former price, often referred to as "willingness to
accept" (WTA), and the latter, commonly called "willingness to pay"
(WTP), sisay range up to many times the lower value. 55 Both WTA
and WTP constitute real and true measures of people's valuations of
entitlements, and so neither can be ignored.56
53 For our purposes, it is immaterial whether a person initially acquired the asset for
resale or for use. Even in the latter case, the subsequent desire to part with the asset
transforms it into an exchange good.
54 See Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 587, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Elizabeth Hoffman &
Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 196-97 (1991).
55 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 225,
228 (1991) (stating that the difference can range from factors of four to sixteen); Daniel S.
Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering Property Rights and the
Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 495 n.6, 506-07 (1994)
(noting that WrA value can be up to twenty times ArTP value).
56 RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 10-11,
84-115 (1982).
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Scholars agree, however, that the very existence and magnitude
of the EE varies from case to case. The available data suggests that the
EE is not due to the enhanced attractiveness of an entitlement one
owns; rather, it represents the pain of giving it up.57 This explanation
regards the EE as a manifestation of people's aversion to losses. 58 If
an individual views parting with an entitlement as a loss, she will de-
mand a higher price for it.5 9 Such feelings of loss are not present in
every transaction. It seems that the EE is manifested mostly in trans-
fers that involve goods held for use, as opposed to goods held for ex-
change. 60 Goods held specifically for sale do not produce an EE, nor
do bargaining chips, vouchers, or tokens that are valued only for their
trading possibilities. In a similar vein, experiments have shown that
the EE is significantly smaller when an adequate substitute for the rel-
evant good is available. 6' Indeed, bargaining chips, vouchers, and to-
kens are perfect substitutes for any good that their owner wishes to
purchase with them. Such is also the case with goods held for ex-
change and goods that owners willingly offer to sell.
Because "use value" is a good proxy for intense preferences, the
law should locate circumstances in which use value exists and where
the market would likely fail to protect owners against involuntary in-
jury to this value. I will demonstrate this scenario with two examples:
statutory rights of first refusal and compensation for takings of land.
Statutory Rights of First Refusal
Rights of first refusal (RFR) require owners to offer certain prop-
erty to the right holder for the same price proposed by a third party.
Only if the right holder rejects the offer will the owner be allowed to
57 Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 299-300 (1992).
58 On the "loss aversion" explanation for the EE, see Camerer, supra note 54, at
668-70; Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 54, at 87-91.
59 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265-69, 274 (1979).
60 See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 54, at 78-82, 111, 113; Daniel Kahneman et al,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325,
1328-32, 1344 (1990).
61 Wiktor L. Adamowicz et al., Experiments on the Difference Between Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept, 69 LAND ECON. 416, 421-24 (1993) (finding that differences between
WTA and WTP for tickets to a national hockey league game considerably decreased when a
substitute for personal attendance-live television and radio broadcasts of the game-exis-
ted). W. Michael Hanemann argues theoretically for the claim that adequate substitutes
decrease the magnitude of the EE in W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willing-
ness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 Am. EcoN. REv. 635, 635, 637, 646 (1991).
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sell the property to the third party.62 RFR are only valuable if the
property's worth for the right holder exceeds its worth for potential
buyers,63 and where assets are unique for the right holders. Were it
not so, there would be no point in having a right to purchase a specific
asset that entitles an individual to overcome a buyer by matching her
price.
It is ordinarily difficult to identify, in advance, the people who
would value unique assets more than others. For this reason, individu-
als are normally left to fend for themselves-that is, to contract for
RFR on a case-by-case basis. 64 There are, however, circumstances in
which ex ante generalizations are very plausible, while the market is
likely to fail. In these clear cases, statutory grants of RFR are justifiable
on both efficiency and fairness grounds.
A good example is concurrent ownership of assets such as homes
and farms. Tenancy in common in nonbusiness contexts often in-
volves family relations. Spouses may jointly own their residence, and
siblings may jointly inherit their parents' farm. 65 Co-owners have
vested property rights in the asset and may exercise their rights by
selling or mortgaging their share and by applying for partition with-
out the consent of the other owners.66 It is highly probable that co-
owners of this kind would value the exiting co-owner's share much
more highly than any outsider. This is due both to their continuous
use of-and subsequent attachment to-the property as a whole, and
to the dependency of the value of their own share on the identity of
the co-owners. A spouse would not wish to share his or her home, and
an heir would not want to cultivate the family farm with a stranger.
Nonetheless, in these circumstances, individuals are unlikely to con-
62 See Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Rejfsal 5 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law
& Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-99-009, 1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
11382.
63 And, of course, exceeds the property's value for its owner, who otherwise would not
sell it at all.
64 David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 13
(1999) ("[C]ontract is the primary source of first refusal rights.").
65 Tenancy in common is the most common type of concurrent ownership, and in
most jurisdictions there is a presumption in favor of tenancies in common as against other
forms of co-ownership. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
176, 178, 185-87 (3d ed. 2000). See also infra note 74 (discussing tenancy by the entirety).
66 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 50.0219], 50.05[2],
50.07[3] [a] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 65, at
178-79. In the former case, the asset remains in co-ownership and the buyer takes the
seller's place as co-owner of the property. In the latter case, concurrent ownership is dis-
solved by either dividing the asset in-kind between the co-owners, or selling it as a whole
and sharing the proceeds. POWELL, supra, §§ 50.06[4], 50.0711]. Note that even if co-
ownership originally took the form of ajoint tenancy, the sale or mortgage of an individual
co-owner's share creates a tenancy in common between the transferee and the other own-
ers. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 109-10
(3d ed. 1989).
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tract for RFR. Before a conflict has arisen, relationships within the
family are usually informal. 67 Once the relationships turn sour, how-
ever, animosity and spite may obstruct mutually beneficial transac-
tions.68 A similar difficulty arises when a co-owner's individual share is
involuntarily sold in bankruptcy or other execution proceedings initi-
ated by her creditors.
Statutory RFR can solve this problem. If such rights are limited to
situations with high probability of strongly held preferences regarding
the property, they can assure its transfer to those who value it most,
while at the same time saving on transaction costs and avoiding the
risk of bargaining failure. 69 Furthermore, the fact that RFR suffice
with right holders matching third-party offers is doubly beneficial. It
avoids discriminatorily taxing co-owners with unique subjective
value, 7°1 and mitigates the detrimental effect of wealth differentials on
property allocation. 7 1 At the same time, the matching requirement
averts inefficient allocation because a right holder whose valuation is
actually lower than the buyer's offer would not exercise her RFR.72
67 See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1989) (stating that
relatively few couples enter into premarital agreements). This phenomenon is partially
due to the prevailing cognitive bias of over-optimism. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 439, 443-47 (1993) (finding that, notwithstanding accu-
rate knowledge about the rate of divorce, individuals about to be married were confident
that it would not happen to them).
68 See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REiv. 373, 384-406, 421-23 (1999) (examining twenty
nuisance cases and discovering that due, to a large extent, to animosity between the parties
involved, no bargaining occurred or would have occurred after judgment).
69 See Kahan, supra note 62, at 17-18 (discussing how RFR enhance efficiency by
preventing sellers' strategic behavior, which may cause either bargaining breakdown or
waste of potential efficiency gains).
70 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text; Kahan, supra note 62, at 7-8 (ex-
plaining how RFR adversely affect the bargaining power of sellers vis-a-vis the right hold-
ers). RFR reduce wealth effects because the right holder is not required to pay a sum
reflecting her high subjective value. In this respect, RFR differ from rights of first offer
(RFO). For a comparison between RFR and RFO and the effect of information problems
on each one of them, see Kahan, supra note 62, at 4, 11-13.
72 Arguably, the costs potential buyers incur in bidding on property subject to RFR
decrease their offers. Walker, supra note 64, at 16-25. Consequently, the potential buyer's
valuation of the property may actually be higher than that of the right holder (who does
not incur similar costs and has only to match the offer). The fact that statutory RFR apply
only to scenarios in which the gap in intensity between the preferences of buyers and right
holders is likely large considerably mitigates this risk.
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Thus, RFR address the needs of high-valuing holders without overbur-
dening sellers,7 3 or locking them into unwanted relationships.7 4
Under current law, statutory RFR are sporadically and unsys-
tematically scattered in various fields. American law does not recog-
nize, for instance, a general, reciprocal RFR in favor of co-owning
spouses. The Bankruptcy Code contains an isolated RFR, 75 which
deals with the special case where a bankrupt co-owner's trustee sells
the property in its entirety, that is, not only the debtor's interest in the
property but also the share of the nondebtor co-owner. 76 The Code
provides that before the sale can be carried out, the nonbankrupt co-
owner has the right to purchase the property "at the price at which
such sale is to be consummated." 77 It stands to reason that only a
nondebtor spouse with intense preferences regarding the property
will exercise the RFR since, if the forced sale goes through, she will be
entitled to receive her pro rata share in the proceeds.
78
Although a step in the right direction, this legislative provision
addresses only one manifestation of a much broader problem. If one
accepts the reasonable assumption that each spouse's preferences re-
garding jointly held assets are usually much more intense than those
73 Even if the existence of RFR reduce the price offered by potential buyers (as ex-
plained supra note 72), this cost to exiting owners is (at least partially) offset by the fact
that such rights are often reciprocal. Furthermore-and in contrast with options to
purchase-RFR are ordinarily triggered when the person subject to them wishes to sell for
the same price she was willing to accept from a third-party buyer. Walker, supra note 64, at
9-10 (comparing RFR and options). Therefore, one may plausibly assume that the gains
from protecting the right holder's use value surpass the losses (if any) to the seller's ex-
change value.
74 In this respect, RFR differ from tenancy by the entirety, another technique the law
uses to protect co-owners. This form of concurrent ownership has been abolished in all
but twenty jurisdictions, and is available only for ma ied couples. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN.
supra note 65, at 193. Generally speaking, a spouse cannot separately convey or encumber
her interest in the property, and it cannot be seized to satisfy the claims of one spouse's
creditors alone. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 66, at 103-04. Furthermore, tenancy by
the entirety ordinarily terminates only by divorce, and not by regular partition procedures.
Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. Rxv. 1517, 1542 (2003). Tenancy by the
entirety can be criticized as overly restrictive, infringing upon the autonomy of the co-
owner wishing to exit or use her property as collateral for a loan. Moreover, and in con-
trast to RFR, tenancy by the entirety prevents alienation of an individual co-owner's share
even in cases where the other spouse does not value the property more than potential buy-
ers. Comparable criticism can be leveled at the restrictions on alienation in a community
property regime, adopted by nine states. For discussion of these restrictions, see JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUcTION TO PROPERTY 408-09 (2d ed. 2005).
75 11 U.S.C. § 363(i) (2006).
76 The Bankruptcy Code limits this power to certain circumstances. The trustee must
prove, for instance, that partition in-kind of the property is impracticable, and that the sale
of the debtor's interest alone would realize significantly less for the estate than the sale of
the whole. Id. § 363(h).
77 Id. § 363(i); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 363.08[8] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2005).
78 11 U.S.C. § 3630); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 77, § 363.08[9] [a].
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of potential buyers, then RFR are equally justified in other situations
as well. There is no reason to limit RFR to cases where the trustee sells
the co-owned property as a whole rather than only the debtor-spouse's
interest. Moreover, RFR should not be restricted to non-voluntary
bankruptcy proceedings against one of the spouses, but should apply
also where a spouse's share is about to be sold voluntarily, through
mortgage foreclosure, or in the course of probate proceedings. 79
From the protected spouse's point of view, the type of procedure by
which the property's transfer is realized is immaterial.8 0 Plausibly,
statutory RFR should not apply to all assets jointly owned by spouses,
but only to property held for use, which is, therefore, likely to gener-
ate intense preferences. Prime examples of this kind are the spouse's
joint place of residence, their jointly operated business, and their
jointly tended farm.8 1 Moreover, one may argue that statutory RFR in
these cases should not depend on formal title at all: they should be
granted whenever such assets are jointly held and used by spouses,
even if one of them is the sole formal owner of the property.
Compensation for Takings of Land
Compensation awards for the taking of land for public use are
generally based on fair-market value.8 2 However, some legislators-
aware that market value under-compensates owners with high subjec-
tive valuation of their landS8 -have adopted alternative compensation
79 Only the "tenancy in common" form of concurrent ownership is subject to probate
proceedings. Joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety include a right of survivorship.
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 65, at 176-79, 182-83, 193.
80 Similar criticism applies to statutes extending RFR to former owners-mortgagors
upon lenders' resale of foreclosed land, but only with respect to farms and agricultural
homesteads. These RFR are exercisable after statutory redemption periods for mortgages
have lapsed. Thomas J. Houser, A Comparative Study of the Former Owner's Right of First Re-
fusal upon a Lender's Resale of Foreclosed Agricultural Land: A New Form of State Mortgagor Relief
Legislation, 13J. CORP. L. 895, 900-07 (1988) (analyzing various rules). Comparable pro-
tection is not afforded to nonagricultural homesteads. For a discussion of redemption
rights, see infra Part II.D.
81 Under Israeli law, spouses' statutory RFR are restricted to these assets. Land Law,
5729-1969, 23 LSI 283, § 101, at 300 (1968-69) (Isr.). Alternatively, one may argue that
such a limitation is unnecessary, since only co-owning spouses with high subjective valua-
tion of the property will exercise RFR. An interim solution is to extend the statutory RFR
to "mixed value" assets, such as vacation homes, which typically combine use value and
exchange (investment) value. My inclination is to restrict the application of statutory RFR
to assets that are primarily held for personal and continuous use. Because GNP identifiers
rely on generalizations about circumstances where strong preferences exist, and because
statutory RFR entail costs (see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text), it is "safer" to
limit them to cases in which the gap in intensity between the preferences of potential
buyers and right holders is likely to be particularly large.
82 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 30, at 169-71.
83 See id. at 173-74 (listing the reasons that land is often valued above market value);
see also Krier & Serkin, supra note 30, at 866 (noting the limits of fair market value
compensation).
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formulas.8 4 They require the state to add some fixed percentage
above market prices for condemnation of certain kinds of land that
owners continuously use. In these cases, the type of property or the
length of time its owner used it gives rise to the assumption that, were
it not for the expropriation, the owner would have continued holding
the land for her use.
Condemnors in the state of Indiana, for example, are required to
pay 150% of fair market value for parcels that are "occupied by the
owner as a residence. '8 5 Michigan's constitution states that when an
individual's "principal residence" is taken for public use, the compen-
sation award must not be less than 125% of its market value.8 6 In the
same vein, Missouri awards market value multiplied by 125% for a
"homestead taking, '8 7 and sets a multiplier of 150% for "heritage"
property, defined as "property owned within the same family for fifty
or more years."8 8 Scholars also suggest length of use as a factor in
takings law reform, advocating a rising-percentage-scale according to
the number of years that the land was used.89
As these rules demonstrate, generalized and nonpenalizing iden-
tifiers of intense preferences can be-and are-used in the sphere of
takings compensation. Admittedly, employing fixed percentages may
result in over- or undercompensation. 90 The risk of undercompensa-
tion is, however, smaller than it is under the fair market value
formula, and the risk of overcompensation is mitigated by limiting this
method to cases in which the likelihood of above-market valuation is
particularly high. In fact, given the aptness of the "use value" proxy,
84 These legislative reforms have followed in the wake of the Kelo case, Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), which kindled a heated debate of the takings issue. For
disciission of this case and the legislative and scholarly reactions to it, see Wyman, supra
note 42.
85 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-8(2) (A) (West 2008).
86 MICH. CONsT. Art. X, § 2.
87 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 523.039(2), 523.001(3) (West 2009).
88 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 523.039(3), 523.001(2) (West 2009).
89 See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 122 (2005) (testimony of Thomas A. Merrill,
Professor, Colum. Univ. L. School) ("Congress could require that when occupied homes,
businesses or farms are taken, the owner is entitled to a percentage bonus above fair mar-
ket value, equal to one percentage point for each year the owner has continuously occu-
pied the property."); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 783, 814-17 & App. (2006) (suggesting that the government pay homeowners market
value plus an additional two percent per year for each year lived in the home, up to a total
of sixty percent above market value); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 735-37
(1973) (proposing, in the context of compensation for nuisances, that owners of a single-
family home would receive a bonus above market value according to length of use,
through legislated schedules).
90 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 90-92
(1986); Ulen, supra note 31, at 180-81.
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lawmakers should extend this method to other kinds of property held
for personal use, such as businesses and farms. Once the likelihood of
high subjective valuation is apparent, a varying-percentage scale based
on the number of years the owner has used the property seems some-
what rigid. I doubt that the injury to a person who has used her resi-
dence or place of business for twenty years is significantly smaller than
the injury to a person who used such property for fifty years. At the
same time, recourse to preset scales or multipliers considerably
reduces administrative costs as compared to flexible standards.
Note, as well, that compensation rules can utilize the "use value"
identifier in more than one way. In the context of takings, this proxy
is employed to grant landowners additional, or higher compensation.
Contract law, however, sometimes employs "use value" to provide a
solution that avoids the need to quantify strong preferences. For in-
stance, when a promisor renders defective performance-such as con-
structing an apartment in deviance from the agreed specifications-
calculating damages according to the diminution in the apartment's
market value due to the nonconformity might under-compensate the
buyer. This is likely to occur when a party purchases an apartment for
personal or family use rather than for investment or resale.9 In the
"use value" identifier, damages are calculated according to the costs of
completion, that is, the costs of fixing the defects or removing the
nonconformity, even if completion damages considerably surpass dim-
inution in (objective) market value.92 The law protects strong prefer-
ences by placing the injured party in the same position she would
have subjectively occupied had the contract been fully performed,
without trying to directly quantify the strength of her intense
preference.
B. Possession
A different way to contend with intense preferences is to condi-
tion the exercise of a right on a factual requirement that is generally
believed-through observation and experience-to be a good proxy
for intense preferences. By incorporating this proxy into the legal
rule, one assures that only people with strong preferences will be enti-
tled to use the right. A central example of such proxy is "possession,"
as the case of the right to self-help demonstrates below.
91 See Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L.
REv. 59, 120 (2007) (explaining the gap between objective market value and subjective
value of entitlements for the promisee, with respect to goods purchased for self-use).
92 See TimothyJ. Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of
Subjective Value, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 384-99 (1983) (discussing the choice between "dim-
inution in market value" and "completion costs" measures of damages from both norma-
tive and doctrinal perspectives, and highlighting the difference between consumers and
commercial purchasers).
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Ordinarily, a person whose proprietary rights have been violated
must turn to the state for redress. The state does not permit self-en-
forcement even in cases where a property rule protects the entitle-
ment9 3 and does not require calculation of monetary compensation.
Thus, for instance, a buyer entitled to specific performance of a con-
tract cannot obtain the promised asset from the seller by herself, and
an owner of a vacant parcel cannot forcibly expel a wrongful posses-
sor. Both must resort to the state judicial and enforcement systems.
In the transition from a "state of nature" to a state, individuals have
surrendered their power to take their due by force and delegated it to
the state. 94 This rule is perfectly justifiable, as it prevents breaches of
the peace, which may result in grave consequences for many.95
Nevertheless, the law sometimes allows individuals to forcefully
reclaim their property. This privilege of self-help often operates as a
defense against what would otherwise be a tort of assault or battery.9 6
Self-help is limited to the use of reasonable force, 97 and can be exer-
cised only as an immediate response to an attempted-or very re-
cent-invasion of property rights.98 The main prerequisite is that the
93 A "property rule" protects an entitlement if no one can appropriate it without se-
curing the owner's consent. Parties must transfer the entitlement through a voluntary
transaction. "Liability rule" protection, in contrast, enables a forced transfer of the entitle-
ment. The coercing party need not seek the owner's permission, but only pay her the
objectively determined value of the entitlement. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1092, 1105-07 (1972).
C4 See alsco 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 185 (2001) (stating, with respect to
repossession by owners, that "it is better to preserve the government's 'monopoly or, forcc'
than to permit this form of self-help").
95 See id. ("[R]etaking property could lead to bloodshed."); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) (claiming that in a state
of nature, life would be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short").
96 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 21, at 131
(5th ed. 1984). In other countries, such as Israel, a direct right to self-help is acknowl-
edged in the property legislation itself. See Land Law, 5729-1969, 23 LSI 283, § 18, 285
(1968-69) (Isr.).
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 77, 81, 94, 106 (1965); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 96, at § 21, 132-34.
98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 91, 103 (holding that forceful re-entry to
land or reception of chattels is allowed only if the possessor "acts promptly after his dispos-
session or after his timely discovery of it"); DOBBS, supra note 94, at 182 ("The privilege [of
the owner-possessor to use force] continues as long as the owner continues to resist the
intruder and contest his right to be there, even if, for the moment, the owner is literally off
the land. In such a case, the intruder has not acquired a peaceable possession .... [T]he
owner is viewed as defending his own possession."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 96, § 21, at
131, § 22, at 137-40 (explaining that self-help is available not only when resisting disposses-
sion in the first instance but also when acting promptly to discover and recapture assets
following dispossession).
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force-user be the lawful and actual possessor of the property. 99 Mere
ownership or right to gain possession does not suffice.' 0 0
The most persuasive rationale for this requirement is that "posses-
sion" serves as a good proxy for intense preferences. Although all
owners (and persons entitled to possession) may prefer quick self-re-
covery of assets from wrongdoers to a lengthier judicial process, the
preferences of the freshly dispossessed for a self-help remedy are likely to
be much stronger. Compare, for example, an owner who learns of an
invasion of her vacant parcel with an owner who returns from a movie
to discover a trespasser in her home. It is very reasonable to assume
that the strength of the latter's preference for immediately ousting
the intruder is significantly greater than that of the former.10 This
unique intensity is both understandable and acceptable. Society can-
not reasonably expect individuals to successfully curb their spontane-
ous, powerful inclination to prevent dispossession by force. As Justice
Holmes famously stated:
Law, being a practical thing, must found itself on actual forces. It is
quite enough, therefore, for the law, that man, by an instinct which
he shares with the domestic dog . . . will not allow himself to be
dispossessed . . .of what he holds, without trying to get it back
again. Philosophy may find a hundred reasons to justify the in-
stinct, but it would be totally immaterial if it should condemn it and
bid us surrender without a murmur. As long as the instinct remains,
it will be more comfortable for the law to satisfy it in an orderly
manner, than to leave people to themselves. If it should do other-
wise, it would become a matter for pedagogues, wholly devoid of
reality.
102
Nonpossessors, in contrast, will normally have significantly weaker
preferences to obtain immediate possession. For this very reason, ed-
ucating nonpossessors to control their urge to seize their property by
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 4, nn.2, 3 (stating that the privilege is
available only when the actor "is in possession of land or chattels" at the time of the other's
dispossessory acts); KEETON ET AL., supra note 96, § 21, at 131 ("The privilege [of self-help]
may be exercised by anyone in possession of property who has, as against the invader, the
better right to it.").
100 DOBBS, supra note 94, at 182 ("To repossess land in firm possession of another, the
owner must ordinarily resort to judicial process. . . . [I]f the owner uses force to repossess
his own property, the wrongful possessor may have a tort claim.").
101 True, another distinction between the two cases may be that the possessing owner
suffers greater economic injury from the trespass than the nonpossessing owner. This dif-
ference, however, cannot account for limiting self-help to actual possessors. Larger com-
pensation awards for the temporary possession of the wrongdoer can adequately address
the extent of the harm. Possession does notjustify, in itself, a remedy of self-help. Further-
more, there may very well be cases in which the economic damages to a nonpossessing
owner surpass those of a dispossessed owner.
102 OW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 213 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2005) (1881)
(citation omitted).
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force is much more likely to be successful. Therefore, the general
advantages of preventing violence override nonpossessors' desire to
get back their property, and the usual rule that aggrieved parties
should go to court applies.
There are arguably other reasons that explain the existence of
self-help remedies. Scholars have justified it, for instance, by the slow-
ness of court proceedings, 1° 3 or by the fear that chattels will eventually
disappear if owners cannot reclaim them by force. 10 4 These consider-
ations, however, equally apply to nonpossessing owners.1 5 Yet, the priv-
ilege of self-help is not available to the latter. This state of affairs thus
supports the "intensity of preferences" rationale for the differential
treatment of dispossessed and nondispossessed owners.10 6
The law limits self-help to takings that are wrongful from the out-
set, denying use of force against people whose possession was initially
lawful.' 0 7 Landlords usually cannot evict defaulting tenants by
force, 18 and sellers cannot forcefully retake possession from nonpay-
ing buyers.' 0 9 This limitation makes perfect sense. When owners
have voluntarily parted with their assets, their preferences for instanta-
neous redress upon default are less urgent and relatively weaker than
103 KEETON ET AL., supra note 96, § 22, at 137-38.
104 JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 100 (9th ed. 1998) ("[F]ailure promptly to
regain control of a chattel may result in its complete loss because it may become
untraceable .... ").
105 Furthermore, the risk of disappearance does not apply to real property and thus
cannot justify self-help with respect to land.
106 Note that the self-help example demonstrates the difference between the "posses-
sion" and "use value" identifiers discussed above. While the former proxy is relevant to
intense preferences of possessors of any property, the latter applies to property held for
self- or family-use only.
107 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 89, 101 (1965) (pioviding that using force
against another for repossessing land or recaption of chattels is not privileged, unless, inter
alia, the other has tortiously dispossessed the actor without claim of right or has gained
possession by use of force, fraud, or duress). The Restatement further emphasizes that
"[i]f the other has obtained possession of the property with the consent of the actor, there
is no tortious dispossession. Therefore, there is no privilege to use force to effect an entry
upon land wrongfully withheld by an overstaying tenant .... Nor is a remainderman
privileged to enter forcibly after the expiration of a preceding term or life estate." Id. § 89
cmt. a. See also FLEMING, supra note 104, at 100 ("[F]orce is not justified unless the plain-
tiff's adverse possession was wrongful from its inception."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 96,
§ 22, at 139 ("If the plaintiff has come into possession rightfully in the first instance, no
force may be used against him. A defendant who has consented, in the absence of fraud,
to part with his possession, must look to his legal remedy to recover it." (citation omitted)).
108 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.1 (1977); 2
MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 1246-47 (4th ed. 1997); ROBERTS. SCHOSHINSKI,
AMERICAN LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 6:9, at 407-08 (1980). Some states hold that
the tenant's right to ajudicial eviction proceeding cannot be contractually waived, whereas
other states permit such waivers. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 1248-49; SCHOSHINSRi, supra, § 6:6, at
403.
109 DOBBS, supra note 94, at 188-89. This rule is usually mandatory. KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 96, § 22, at 139.
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those of possessing owners. Even if landlords are a heterogeneous
group, with private landlords exhibiting stronger preferences than
commercial ones, it is still generally true that possessing owners have
more intense preferences for a self-help remedy than nonpossessing
owners. Landlords are normally not dependant on the occupied
apartment, and sellers do not need the purchased goods for their own
immediate use. Therefore, their welfare loss from denial of a self-help
remedy is likely to be much smaller than that of possessing owners.l11
C. Declining Marginal Utility
Yet another method of identifying intense preferences relies on
the well-known economic rule of diminishing marginal utility. When
a person consumes more of a good, she derives additional utility from
the extra units.11' However, the rule of declining marginal utility
(DMU) holds that the amount of extra utility enjoyed from every in-
cremental unit of a good usually declines as a person consumes more
and more of the good.112 This rule may apply to any good, be it
money,113 ice-cream, 1t 4 or pet gerbils. 115 The DMU rule applies also
to interpersonal comparisons of utility. Thus, it is frequently used to
justify redistribution of income: the utility gain to the poor from re-
ceiving the additional income presumably outweighs the utility loss to
the rich.' 16
Admittedly, the move from intra- to interpersonal assessments is
not without difficulties. Individuals can diverge in their capacity to
extract utility from money and other goods." 17 It may be the case that
although both A and B experience declining marginal utility, A's wel-
fare enhancement from receiving a seventh unit of a good is larger
1 10 One can justify a mandatory rule prohibiting self-help eviction of tenants with an
additional reason: it prevents the grave, negative effects on tenants' welfare that immediate
eviction would cause. Individuals' self-respect, ability to act autonomously, and ability to
successfully pursue worthwhile goals are severely diminished if the landlord can dispossess
them overnight and can throw their belongings into the street. For elaboration see
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV.
326, 382-83 (2006). Thus, concern for the tenants' well-being can explain the rejection of
a default rule in this context, which might otherwise cater to the idiosyncratically high
preferences of some landlords for a self-help remedy.
I I I ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
26 (1944); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUS, ECONOMICS 84-85 (18th ed.
2005).
112 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 111, at 84; WEIMER & VINING, supra note 9, at
31.
113 See ROBERT SUGDEN & ALAN WILLIAMS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL COsT-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 205-06 (1978).
114 See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 111.
115 POSNER, supra note 9, at 11.
116 See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 128 (1997); SUGDEN & WILLIAMS,
supra note 113.
117 LERNER, supra note 111, at 28-29; POSNER, supra note 9, at 494.
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than B's welfare gains from receiving a fifth unit of the same good.
Nonetheless, it is ordinarily assumed that since we have no way of as-
certaining whether this is actually the case, the most plausible general
assumption is that people's marginal utility curves are similar. 18
The DMU rule, then, can serve as a proxy for intense prefer-
ences. When allocating goods, we may sometimes reasonably assume
that the incremental utility from having the good would be larger for
the person with the fewer units of the good. As with comparable gen-
eralizations, one should rely upon this assumption cautiously. Thus,
legal rules should aim at the relatively extreme cases: those in which
the marginal utility to the recipients is likely to be especially large
since they have no, or very little, of the (re)allocated good. In such
cases, one may quite confidently assume that the marginal utility gain
to the receivers is large enough to outweigh the possibility that
nonreceivers of the good would extract greater utility from it. In what
follows, I discuss two examples that employ the DMU rule: property
exempted in bankruptcy and selection of parents for adoption.
Bankruptcy Exemptions
Personal bankruptcy law strives to ensure orderly payment of mul-
tiple creditors when there are not enough assets to satisfy fully these
claims. 119 Another important goal is to guarantee debtors sufficient
resources to be able to start afresh and rehabilitate in reasonable liv-
ing conditions. 120 Accordingly, both federal and state laws protect
some of the debtor's property from the reach of her creditors. Such
rules are known as "exemptions" in bankruptcy. 12 1 Nonexempt assets
are sold and their proceeds are used to pay the debts. 22
Federal and state exemptions share some common fcatures. For
instance, exemptions identify certain types of protected property,
1 18 LERNER, supra note 111, at 26-32, 35-36 (explaining why equal division of income
would maximize probable total utility in society). Philosophical literature has addressed
the extreme problem of "utility monsters" who possess extraordinary capacity to distill util-
ity from every unit of a good. Such people may experience steady increases in utility that
do not decline-or diminish very slowly-with quantity. See infra note 277 and accompany-
ing text. Even assuming that "utility monsters" exist, the crafting of generalized legal rules
should be based on the ordinary-rather than the exceptional-case.
119 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 2-3 (1993); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 4-5 (1986).
120 Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REv. 851, 853
(1999).
121 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 593-97.
122 Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 587 (2000); MichelleJ. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at
the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
685, 687 (1998).
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such as the debtor's home, 23 household goods and furnishings, 124
personal items like books and pets, 125 and tools and implements of
business or trade. 12 6  In addition, the law limits exemptions by
value. 12 7 Any item on the exemption list surpassing the fixed maxi-
mum value can be sold, and creditors may usually capture only the
excess value above the exemption amount.1
28
Scholars have acknowledged that efficiency considerations can
support the exemption of some of a debtor's wealth. Such protection
provides insurance (unavailable in the market) to risk-averse borrow-
ers against the inability to repay loans subsequent to sharp income
fluctuations. 129 At the same time, law-and-economics literature has
criticized prevailing exemption rules for creating a detailed list of
types of protected assets instead of employing a single exemption
based on a fixed monetary amount. 130 The latter, so the argument
goes, would allow debtors to choose which assets they wish to exempt
(up to the limited statutory ceiling),13 1 and reduce incentives to con-
vert assets from nonexempt to exempt categories-a costly and waste-
ful practice. 132
Rather than generally discussing the appropriate structure, con-
tent, and mandatory nature of the bankruptcy exemptions,' 33 I wish
to highlight a justification for exempted wealth, in whichever form it
takes. Exemptions aim to ensure that people retain an amount or as-
sortment of resources deemed essential for their decent physical and
mental existence. Without any exemptions, individuals would face the
catastrophic prospect of having "zero property." Exemptions guaran-
tee debtors a state of "minimal property." At the same time, allowing
creditors to foreclose the protected property would ordinarily have a
123 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730 (West
2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2008).
124 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.020; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5205.
125 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3)-(4); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 704.040.
126 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/12-1001(d) (West 2008); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5205(a) (7).
127 11 U.S.C. § 522(d); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 603, 607-08.
128 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 607, 612, 614.
129 See Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. white, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure
and Proposed Reforms, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256-59 (2000); White, supra note 122, at 692.
130 White, supra note 122, at 700.
131 See Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on Exemption
Laws, 74 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275, 315-17 (2000); Mendales, supra note 120, at 867.
132 White, supra note 122, at 713. In addition, some writers have argued that most
exemptions should be waivable, except those pertaining to assets necessary to generate
income. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 122, at 591, 599-601, 609.
133 Elsewhere I have argued that an objective theory of well-being can justify the three
characteristics of current exemption rules: protection of a plurality of types of property (in
lieu of some global amount of wealth), placement of value limitations on each category of
exempted property, and non-enforcement of waivers in favor of unsecured creditors. See
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 21, at 1726-30.
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much smaller effect on their welfare, moving them from a position of
"some property" (or even "a great deal of property") to that of "some-
what more property."1 34 According to the DMU rule, the resources'
value in the hands of the debtor is significantly higher than in the
hands of the creditors.1 35 Therefore, debtors should retain this mini-
mal amount of wealth.
Adoption
The use of the DMU rule in dealing with intense preferences is
not limited to market contexts. Take, for instance, the selection of
adoptive parents. In Western countries it is a well-known fact that the
demand for healthy babies for adoption greatly surpasses the sup-
ply.136 Matching children and parents is a complex and sensitive is-
sue, involving various considerations, paramount of which is the
child's interest. 137 To this end, rules regulating adoption commonly
require that adopters be of a certain age, in good physical and mental
health, and possess minimal levels of education and stable income. 138
These important prerequisites, however, only narrow-but do not
eliminate-the competition over each healthy baby.
At this juncture, the law may reasonably consider the potential
adopters and seek to identify those whose preferences for adopting a
child are the most intense. A plausible proxy in this respect is the
134 The phrase "somewhat" is especially fitting in the bankruptcy context. Since there
are typically numerous creditors and insufficient assets to satisfy their claims, creditors
would have received, in any case, only a small fraction of the minimal-exempted wealth.
135 This argument is strongest with respect to institutional and voluntary creditors.
The DMU rationale is not always applicable to non-voluntary tort creditors, or to employ-
ees of a bankrupt employer. Furthermore, the DMU logic is based on the rule, adopted in
almost all states, which limits the maximum value of exempted property. See supra notes
127-28 and accompanying text. The logic does not apply to the laws of Florida and Texas,
which place no monetary cap on the value of an exempted homestead. FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 4; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 50.
136 See JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: How INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE SCARCE GOODS AND
NECESSARY BURDENS 48 (1992) (citing empirical findings that for every healthy, white baby
there are forty couples waiting to adopt it); see also Donald Brieland, Selection of Adoptive
Parents, in ADoPTION: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS 65, 78 (Paul Sachdev ed., 1984) (ex-
plaining the shortage of infants for adoption with three factors: "improved methods of
contraception, the availability of abortion, and the increasing desires of mothers to keep
their babies").
137 See European Convention on the Adoption of Children art. 8(1), Apr. 24, 1967,
Europ. T.S. No. 58 [hereinafter European Convention on Adoption] ("The competent
authority shall not grant an adoption unless it is satisfied that the adoption will be in the
interest of the child.").
138 See ELSTER, supra note 136, at 48-49 (noting that the eligibility criteria of adoption
agencies often exclude people above the age of forty and low-income families, and that
social workers examine the emotional and personality characteristics of applicants); see also
European Convention on Adoption, supra note 137, art. 9(2) (a) (requiring an examina-
tion of "the personality, health and means of the adopter, particulars of his home and
household and his ability to bring up the child").
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number of children that applicants have and their ability to procreate.
It stands to reason that infertile people with no other children (either
biological or adopted) have the strongest preferences. According to
the DMU rule, the shift from having no children to having one child
would increase adopters' welfare to a larger extent than the shift from
one child to two, or from two children to three.13 9 In fact, adoption
rules in some countries implicitly acknowledge this phenomenon.
They limit the adoption of babies to infertile, childless couples, 140 or
control the number of babies that any one couple can adopt. 141 Inter-
estingly, such restrictions have been criticized on the ground that
there is neither evidence that infertile couples make better adoptive
parents, 142 nor proof that the presence of biological children detri-
mentally affects the adopted ones. 143 Had adoption rules been evalu-
ated solely through the lens of the children's well-being, this critique
would have been decisive. I believe, however, that the welfare of the
potential adopters should not be excluded from the decision process.
Although infertility or childlessness should not constitute rigid pre-
139 Arguably, individuals vary in the strength of their preferences for children. Al-
though some people desire children very strongly, others' desire (if it exists at all) is much
weaker. Possibly, one person's move from one child to two could increase her welfare to a
greater extent than another person's move from no children to one. However, as ex-
plained above, employing the logic of DMU inevitably involves some generalizations. Supra
notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Such generalizations seem particularly plausible in
the present context because people seeking adoption presumably have strong preferences
for having children and are, therefore, a more homogeneous group than the general pop-
ulation of potential parents.
140 AMNON BEN-DROR, ADOPTION AND SURROGACY IN ISRAEL 54 (1994, in Hebrew) (re-
porting that the Israeli adoption agency does not grant adoption of healthy babies to par-
ents with a biological child);JONATHAN HERRING, FAMILY LAw 587 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing
the law in England and noting that it is common to require that applicant couples be
infertile); Marianne Berry, Adoption Disruption, in ADOPTION POLICV AND SPECIAL NEEDS
CHILDREN 83 (RosemaryJ. Avery ed., 1997) (noting that "some agencies have required that
the adoptive couple be infertile and that no other biological children be present in the
home").
141 BEN-DROR, supra note 140, at 54 (stating that the Israeli agency does not allow the
adoption of more than two healthy babies); see also Elizabeth S. Cole, Societal Influences on
Adoption Practice, in ADOPTION: CURRENrr ISSUES AND TRENDS, supra note 136, at 15, 21 (ob-
serving that the shortage in infants for adoption results in a "dim chance that a second or
third baby will be placed" with the same couple).
142 NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
ACT 1965 (NSW), DISCUSSION PAPER 34, 126-27 (1994). See a/soJANE ROWE, PARENTS, CHIL,
DREN AND ADOPTION: A HANDBOOK FOR ADOPTION WORKERS 172-73 (1966) (explaining that
people who have had biological children may be more experienced and relaxed parents).
143 NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE ADOPTION OF CHILDREN
AcT 1965 (NSW), REPORT 81, 213 (1997); see e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the
Rationale for Requiring Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 Am. J.L. & MED. 337, 341
(2003) (quoting JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1434 (4th ed. 1999)
(noting that a "darker explanation" for the infertility requirement was that some agencies
"feared that a fertile couple giving birth to a child after adoption may lead to the neglect of
the adopted child")); cf Berry, supra note 140, at 84 (citing conflicting sources as to
whether placement into families with children disrupts the family unit).
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conditions to adoption, 144 they are legitimate considerations in choos-
ing among similarly qualified prospective adopters. 45 This is so not
only for obvious fairness reasons, 146 but for the above efficiency rea-
son as well. Note that this proxy for strong preferences is preferable
to the "willingness to pay" proxy advocated by proponents of "a mar-
ket in babies"1 47 because it does not discriminate on the basis of afflu-
ence,148 and is not prone to the commodification critique. 149
144 Wilson, supra note 143, at 341-42 (stating that a growing number of adoption agen-
cies have done away with requiring adoptive parents to be infertile).
145 The European Convention on the Adoption of Children rejects placing a rigid
legal restriction on the number of children that a person may adopt, but does not deny
that "numbers" may be a factor in allocation decisions. European Convention on Adop-
tion, supranote 137, art. 12(1). The number of children that a prospective adopter already
has may be relevant in many circumstances, for instance, when allocating healthy babies,
where demand overwhelmingly surpasses the supply. See supra note 136 and accompanying
text. In contrast, this consideration may be unwarranted with respect to older or handi-
capped children where, in practice, the reverse holds true. See ELSTER, supra note 136, at
49; Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7J. LEGAL
STUD. 323, 324-25, 328 (1978). Similarly, although Article 12(2) of the European Conven-
tion on the Adoption of Children states that "[a] person who has, or is able to have, a child
born in lawful wedlock, shall not on that account be prohibited by law from adopting a
child," it does not preclude consideration of this matter in adoption decisions. Further-
more, Article 24 of the Convention allows states to exclude the application of Article 12(2).
European Convention on Adoption, supra note 137.
146 NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, supra note 142, at 127 (citing the view
that "it is 'only just' that the relatively few available children should be made available to
people who cannot have biological children of their own").
147 Landes & Posner, supra note 145, at 336-37, 343, 347-48 (arguing that a free mar-
ket would increase the supply of babies by encouraging women-through monetary pay-
ments-to nut their infants up for adoption instead of aborting them at the fetus stage).
t48 True, even guidelines of public adoption agencies require prospective parents to
have an adequate, stable income. Consequently, the applications of the very poor would
be denied, notwithstanding the strength of their preferences. Nevertheless, there is still an
important difference between the outcomes of such guidelines and the free market. Adop-
tion regulations address the minimum level of income necessary for the provision of a
child's basic needs. ROWE, supra note 142, at 169 (stating that individuals with "a standard
of living too low for the safety, health and normal development of the child" should be
disqualified for adoptive parenthood). People with modest, though sufficient, means
would qualify for adoption on par with affluent people. The market, in contrast, would
grant adoption to the highest bidder and place no limitations on the number of infants
that any one family can adopt, thus affording wealth differentials a much larger role.
149 See, e.g., MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. RE-v. 1849, 1925-28
(1987) (arguing that commodification of babies greatly injures people's conceptions of
personhood and flourishing). Admittedly, even the rule of DMU would not eliminate all
competition for healthy babies. For every available baby there is likely to be more than one
infertile couple with no previously adopted children, that equally conforms to all the for-
mal prerequisites. The only appropriate solution to this problem may very well be "queu-
ing": babies would be allocated to similarly eligible couples according to a waiting list. See
Landes & Posner, supra note 145, at 326, 342 (noting the existence of waiting lists in this
context). The length of a childless couple's wait for an infant can serve as a proxy for both
their desire and the intensity of their preferences.
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D. Redemption
Another way to detect strong preferences is to create legal rights
that only (or mainly) people with intense preferences would wish to
use. Although, theoretically, any person is free to exercise the right,
in practice only individuals with intense preferences will bother to do
so. In these cases, behavior-through actual use of a right-both
identifies the strong preference and caters to its needs. A prime ex-
ample is a right of redemption.
Secured Transactions
Rights of redemption are commonly found in the field of secured
transactions. When lenders advance money to borrowers, they usually
secure its return by acquiring a security interest in the debtor's prop-
erty. Ordinarily, the debtor retains title in the property serving as col-
lateral for the loan. 150 Upon default, the creditor files suit to
foreclose on the property and the court orders its sale.15 ' The pro-
ceeds of the sale are then used to pay off the debt, and any excess
funds are transferred to the debtor. 152
Right of redemption (RR) in secured transactions law affords
debtors a major protection. An RR gives defaulting debtors the op-
portunity to redeem the property subject to the security interest by
late payment of the balance owed. 153 The RR can be exercised until
the property is sold in foreclosure proceedings, 154 and the debtor can-
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1(a) (1997) ("A mortgage creates
only a security interest in real estate .... "); SINGER, supra note 74, at 564. Sometimes,
however, the title to the property is given to the creditor during the repayment period, and
the debtor obtains or regains title upon payment of the debt. In the past, mortgages in
land always took this form. See 4 POWELL, supra note 66, at § 37.03. Secured transactions
law covers these situations as well, since it applies to any transaction that creates a security
interest, regardless of its outward form or the name given to it by the parties. UNIF. COM.
CODE §§ 9-109(a) (1), 3 U.L.A. 105-11 (2009) [hereinafter U.C.C.]; 1 U.C.C. § 1-201(37),
at 69 (defining "security interest"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 3.2-3.3
(holding that absolute deeds and conditional sales intended as security for an obligation
should be deemed a mortgage); GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORT-
GAGES 145-46 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining the maxim "once a mortgage, always a mortgage,"
which regards creditors with title to the property as mortgagees). For discussion of the
role of rights of redemption in such cases, see infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
151 F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 132-33, 136 (3d ed.
2002); see also OSBORNE, supra note 150, at 661-62 (judicial sale "is the exclusive or gener-
ally used method of foreclosure in a substantial majority of states and is available in all by
virtue of express statutory enactment").
152 3 U.C.C. § 9-615(d), at 532; 30 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM & SAUL TISCHLER, NEW
JERSEY PRACInCE: LAW OF MORTGAGES § 202, at 54-55 (1975).
153 3 U.C.C. § 9-623, at 554-55; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 (a)
(1997); OSBORNE, supra note 150, at 624.
154 CUNNINGHAM & TiSCHLER, supra note 152, § 184, at 17; see also 3 U.C.C. § 9-
623(c) (2), at 555 (RR ends when the secured party has disposed of the collateral or en-
tered into a contract for its disposition). Some states, however, have adopted a statutory
right of redemption, which grants mortgagors an additional designated period (typically
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not waive it at the time the security interest is created. 155 Conse-
quently, debtors are afforded a "last chance" to retain their property,
free of the security right.
RR can be viewed as a technique for identifying intense prefer-
ences because only people with strong preferences regarding their
property would employ it. When the property in question has no
unique subjective value for the debtor, why would she bother to exer-
cise her RR? If the amount owed equals or exceeds the property's
value, she may leave it in the hands of the secured creditor,15 6 and use
the money she now holds to purchase a substitute in the market. Al-
ternatively, if the outstanding debt is lower than the market value of
the asset, allowing a foreclosure sale to go forward should achieve sim-
ilar results. Since the debtor is entitled to the difference between the
sale's proceeds and the debt, she can add this sum to the other funds
she currently has, and likewise purchase an adequate replacement. 157
Therefore, an RR is valuable precisely because it allows debtors to
retain ownership of a particular asset, one that has-subjectively-no
from six to eighteen months) to regain their former land-after it was sold-by paying the
new owner the price bid at the foreclosure sale (plus interest and reimbursement for the
costs of the sale). 5 POWELL, supra note 66, § 37.46; Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis
of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489, 495 (1991). See also infra note 168 and
accompanying text.
155 3 U.C.C. §§ 9-602(11), at 496 & 9-624(c), at 556 (providing that in a consumer
goods transaction, the RR may not be waived at all, and that with respect to other goods, a
waiver is valid only if included in an agreement entered into and authenticated after de-
fault); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 (b) (incorporating the same rule);
CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 152, § 184, at 14-15 ("The equitable right of redemp-
tion is an incident of every mortgage, regardless of the form the mortgage may take; and
the right to redeem cannot be waived or released by a stipulation to that effect in the
mortgage itself, or even by a separate contemporaneous agreement to that effect.").
156 Waiver of foreclosure sales and RR are valid if embodied in a written agreement
entered into at a date later than the date of the security interest's creation. Such valid
agreements are usually formed after the debtor's default. 5 POWELL, supra note 66,
§ 37.44[1]; see also 3 U.C.C. § 9-620, at 546-49 (giving effect to the debtor's consent for a
creditor to accept the collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures,
only if the debtor includes the consent in a record authenticated after default). Thus, a
defaulting debtor who does not value the collateral beyond its market value can simply
avoid the costs of both a foreclosure sale and a redemption process by leaving the asset to
the secured creditor.
157 True, foreclosure sales involve costs, which are deducted from the debtor's share of
the proceeds. 3 U.C.C. § 9-615, at 531-33; CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 152,
§§ 331-334, at 250-58. RR, however, also entails costs that are likewise borne by the
debtor. See 3 U.C.C. § 9-623(b) (2), at 554-55 (redeemers must pay all the obligations se-
cured by the collateral, plus the creditor's reasonable expenses and attorney's fees); CuN-
NINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 152, § 183, at 7-8 (noting that a redeemer must pay not
only the entire debt secured by the mortgage and her own costs in the redemption action
but also the costs of the mortgagee in this action, plus any costs the latter incurred in
enforcing the mortgage). Furthermore, debtors financially able to redeem but who
choose not to will bear the additional costs of purchasing an alternative good in the mar-
ket. Therefore, one cannot persuasively argue that debtors would exercise RR mainly to
avoid the costs of foreclosure sales.
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substitute. By exercising the right and favoring redemption of the col-
lateral over alternative uses of the money, debtors prove-through be-
havior-the strength of their preferences for the property. At the
same time, an RR protects people with intense preferences without
taxing their high subjective valuation. Once the debt is paid, they are
allowed to hold on to the property and fully enjoy this surplus. Conse-
quently, this identifier of strong preferences is much less prone to the
wealth effects and fairness problems that plague MP techniques. 58
One may inteiject, at this point, that an RR serves additional
goals that are equally beneficial for debtors who do not value the col-
lateral above its market price. A common justification for RR is that it
curbs creditors' ability to acquire or sell the property for less than its
fair market value and to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of
debtors. Thus, for instance, if the secured creditor is the only bidder
at the foreclosure sale,' 59 she might submit a bid below market value
and so decrease the excess proceeds that are subsequently transferred
to the debtor. 160 Moreover, in the cases where security interests were
created by transferring title in the property to the creditor, 61 the
debtor's default may result in the former owning property whose mar-
ket value significantly surpasses the amount owed. 162 The exercise of
an RR staves off these problems, and its very existence may prompt
secured creditors, of their own accord, to bid or sell the property for
its fair market value. 1 63
This argument is not wholly convincing. True, an RR can some-
times (indirectly) protect debtors without intense preferences regard-
ing the property. There are, however, superior ways to safeguard the
interests of this group. If, indeed, our only fear is monetary loss of
market value, this risk can be addressed by publicizing foreclosure
158 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. Admittedly, not all debtors with
strong preferences would have the financial means to redeem the collateral. Nonetheless,
wealth effects play a much smaller role in RR than in MP mechanisms, because the former
only requires the redeemer to pay the outstanding debt and not any of her subjectively
high valuation of the asset. For example, if a house with a market price of $100,000 is
valued by its owner at $200,000 and serves as collateral for a $20,000 loan, paying off the
debt leaves the owner's surplus value intact.
159 OSBORNE, supra note 150, at 18 (noting that the mortgagee is "usually the chief if
not the only bidder").
160 SINGER, supra note 74, at 567. A similar problem arises if the secured creditor sells
the property to a third party for a low price that covers the outstanding debt, but leaves
no-or an unfairly low-surplus for the debtor.
161 See sources cited supra note 150.
162 SINGER, supra note 74, at 565.
163 5 POWELL, supra note 66, § 37.46 (asserting that redemption statutes offer "strong
inducement to the mortgagee to bid a price more commensurate with the value of the
land"); Schill, supra note 154, at 496 (noting that RR can encourage purchasers "to bid up
the price to fair market value").
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sales, 164 requiring judicially supervised sales,' 6 5 or compelling such
sales even when the contract creating the security interest provides
that the creditor unconditionally retains (or immediately gains) title
to the property upon default. 166 These alternative rules are better
than RR for debtors lacking intense preferences because they safe-
guard the debtors' financial interest in receiving market value, even
when they cannot get the money to redeem the collateral.1 67 In con-
trast, these measures cannot protect debtors with high subjective valu-
ation of the property because they assure, at most, the payment of
market value by others. This state of affairs supports the contention that
the unique, main role of RR is to identify-and cater to-the special
needs of people with intense preferences.' 6 8
Lost Property
Once the ability of RR to deal with intense preferences is ac-
knowledged, its application may be extended beyond the law of se-
cured transactions. One possible extension is granting an RR to
original owners of lost property.
164 Thereby increasing the chances of multiple bidders for the property. SINGER, supra
note 74, at 567.
165 CUNNINGHAM & TISCHLER, supra note 152, § 202, at 55 (legislatures can require
judicial sales to determine "'the fair market value of the mortgaged premises at the time of
the sale'") (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-3 (2000)); 4 POWELL, supra note 66, § 37.40
(discussing statutes that require an appraisal in advance of the sale or permit courts to
determine a minimum sale price).
166 5 POWELL, supra note 66, § 37.44[3] (stating that when an absolute conveyance is
declared to be a mortgage, the debtor may be entitled to a statutory foreclosure by judicial
sale). As explained in note 156, supra, such stipulations are valid only if agreed upon after
the formation of the security interest or the debtor's default.
167 Furthermore, an RR, in itself, would not prevent a secured creditor from making a
low bid for the property if she estimates that the debtor would not be able to redeem it. Se
5 POWELL, supra note 66, § 37.46 (" [I]n times of economic depression the financial re-
sources to redeem are usually beyond the grasp of the mortgagor.").
168 Some scholars claim that statutes permitting redemption after foreclosure, see supra
note 154, deter potential buyers from bidding on the property since such statutes do not
guarantee the buyer indefeasible title. Consequently, such an RR injures mortgagors by
raising the costs of credit and reducing the revenue from the sale of collateral. 5 POWELL,
supra note 66, § 37.46; James Geoffrey Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C. L. REv. 461, 484, 485-86 (1985). Other
writers contend that this detrimental effect is much smaller than the critiques assume.
Schill, supra note 154, at 498-500, 505-15 (asserting that mortgagor protections only mod-
estly affect loan interest rates and promote economic efficiency by insuring debtors against
adverse effects of default and foreclosure). Be that as it may, to the extent that such ad-
verse effects exist, RR works to the advantage of potential redeemers, at the expense of
debtors who do not wish to redeem, and who are only interested in ensuring that the
collateral will be sold for its fair market value. This state of affairs supports my argument
that RR is mainly addressed to people with intense preferences, by securing the return of a
particular asset to the person who values it most. Even if RR raises borrowing costs and
prevent some people from purchasing assets in the first place, this regrettable effect does
not detract from my argument, to the extent that strong preferences in this context are
formed gradually, through subsequent possession or use of the assets.
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Lost property statutes commonly encourage finders to report lost
goods and search for their owners by granting them title to the prop-
erty if the owners have not been located within a short period of
time. 169 An RR, if legislated, could grant original owners an addi-
tional period (say, of one year) to reclaim their lost asset by paying the
finder its market value.1 70 Although applicable in theory to all owners
of lost property, only original owners who have strong preferences re-
garding the asset-a person who lost a necklace of great sentimental
value, for instance-would likely exercise redemption. Owners lack-
ing above-market valuation will not bother to redeem from finders,
but will rather buy a substitute in the marketplace. 171 Absent an RR,
finders would be aware that only owners with intense preferences
would wish to buy back the property. Consequently, finders would
charge a supra-competitive price. An RR fulfills intense preferences
without taxing their holders' special valuation: the original owner is
only required to pay the ordinary, market price of the asset. At the
same time, the award of the property's market value to finders is a
sufficiently high windfall, creating ample incentives to report lost
property and search for its owners. 172 Restricting the RR to a rela-
169 Typically, between three months and one year. See CAL. CiV. CODE § 2080.3 (West
2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 705.104 (West 2009); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1020/28 (West
2008); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 134, § 4 (LeixNexis 2008); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 257 (McKin-
ney 2009); Fisher v. Klingenberger, 576 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (N.Y. Cit. Ct. 1991) (stating that
if the time limits in New York's statute for the owner's retention of the property have
expired, "then the true owner has forfeited his original title to the property, and the prop-
erty belongs to the finder"). This outcome deviates from the original position of the com-
mon law, which does not confer title upon the finder. Rather, the common law regards
the finder as bailee for the true owner, and gives the finder the right to possess and enjoy
the property against all others. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 24,
30 (Walter B. Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). Since, according to the common law, the
original owner has never lost title to the property, she does not need an RR to ensure its
repossession.
170 Such an RR exists in Israeli law. Restoration of Lost Property Law, 5733-1973, 27
LSI 187, § 5, at 188 (1972-73) (Isr.).
171 The existence of owners with strong preferences regarding lost property is realistic
because we are dealing with people who have recently and involuntarily been parted from
their personal property. Therefore, an RR is appropriate. The case of land, however, is
different. As an immovable, it cannot be lost in the same sense as movable property. Al-
though we may speak of land as involuntarily "lost" to an adverse possessor, there is no
justification for granting an RR to the original owner. This is because we cannot assume
that landowners have typically more intense preferences regarding the land than adverse
possessors. On the contrary, adverse possession can arise, in the first place, only if the
original owner was an absentee owner for a long period of time or was unaware of her
ownership in the land. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that she had developed high
subjective valuation of the land. Consequently, an original owner wishing to regain title to
the land must purchase it from the adverse possessor through an ordinary market
transaction.
172 This argument is particularly strong as regards casually found lost property, rather
than deliberately sought-after lost property, because in the former case, incentivizing finders
is less of a concern. Cf Anthony T. Kronman, Mistakes, Disclosure, Information, and the Law
of Contracts, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-18 (1978) (famously distinguishing between "casually"
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tively short period also reduces finders' uncertainty regarding their
future enjoyment of the property. Moreover, such limitation is neces-
sary to avert the possibility that the finders themselves would develop
over-market valuation of the asset.
E. Reasons
Our last example of a method for identifying intense preferences
is requiring people to provide reasons for their preferences. When a
person merely states a preference for good X over good Y, we have no
way of knowing whether the favored option is only slightly preferred
to the next in line or immensely preferred to it.17 3 It is easier to assess
the intensity and authenticity of preferences when they are backed up
by reasons. As this Article will demonstrate, both the fact that reasons
are offered and their content are important.
The very provision of reasons may indicate the strength of the
preferences. There is effort and urgency in the offering of reasons
that is lacking when preferences are stated without explanation. A
person giving reasons for preference rankings strives to persuade the
decisionmaker of the importance of fulfilling her preferences. More
importantly for our purposes, rational and compelling reasons for
favoring one option over another can establish that an intense prefer-
ence actually exists. Offering persuasive reasons also mitigates the risk
of lying. It is more difficult to provide credible reasons for the pur-
ported intensity of a preference when it is false.1 74
A simple illustration for this role of reasons is the allocation of
seminar topics. I give the students participating in my seminar a list of
topics to choose from for their written paper assignment. Usually,
more than one student requests the same topic. Asking the students
to rank three or four options in order of priority does not always solve
this problem. I therefore encourage my students to explain why they
prefer any of the topics. This practice assists me in identifying the
and "deliberately acquired information" in the context of disclosure duties in contract law,
and arguing that a duty to disclose casually acquired information will not significantly de-
tract from people's incentives to obtain socially useful information). Even in the rarer
cases of deliberate searches for lost property, the prospect of receiving its market value
should certainly suffice to encourage potential finders to search for the property and re-
port to the relevant authority.
173 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
174 See WEIMER & VINING, supra note 9, at 117 (noting, in the context of voting, that the
minority's incentive to overstate the intensity of its preferences may be "checked only by
the need to maintain some level of credibility"). To be sure, identification of intense pref-
erences is not the only-or even primary-role of reasons-giving. Reasons are ordinarily
offered to convince others of the merit of one's position, and are judged accordingly.
Nevertheless, I will demonstrate below that a reasons-requirement sometimes serves the
additional role of identifying strong preferences. See infta note 207 and accompanying
text.
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students whose preference for a topic is particularly strong because
such students offer lucid and persuasive reasons for their priorities.
Students who have a relatively weak preference for any topic usually
do not mention reasons at all or offer bland explanations, such as: "It
sounds like an interesting topic." The same rationale underlies the
requirement of reasons-giving in more substantial contexts, such as
conscientious objection.
Many democratic countries recognize individuals' freedom of
conscience by granting an exemption from military service to consci-
entious objectors (COs).' 75 A person who deeply and sincerely be-
lieves that binding obligations of conscience prevent him or her from
bearing arms may be exempted from participating in violent com-
bat.' 76 Consequently, no punishment would be meted out for refusal
to serve. 77 Originally, only objections based on religious foundations
were accepted.1 78 Exemption was granted to specific religious sects,
such as the Quakers, who reject war as part of their preaching. 179
Gradually, however, the exemption was expanded to include consci-
entious objection grounded in secular moral convictions.1 80
For the purposes of this Article, I need not discuss whether such
an exemption is justified,' 8 ' and if it should be limited to "universalis-
tic" COs who reject wars in any form, 182 or extended to individuals
opposed to a particular war.' 83 My interest lies in the following ques-
175 For surveys of the legal treatment of COs in various countries, see EUROPEAN CON-
SORTIUM FOR CHURCH-STATE RESEARCH, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE EC COUNTRIES
(1992); THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: FROM SACRED TO SECULAR RESISTANCE
(Charles C. Moskos &John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993) [hereinafter THE NEW CON-
SCIENTIOUS OBJECTION].
176 Charles C. Moskos &John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Secularization of Conscience, in
THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, supra note 175, at 3-5.
177 Wolfgang Loschelder, The Non-Fulfillment of Legally Imposed Obligations Because of Con-
flicting Decisions of Conscience-The Legal Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), in
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE EC COUNTRIES, supra note 175, at 3, 27-29 (stating that if
a person is recognized as a CO, then "there is no penalty for non-compliance with the
law").
178 Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection,
1971 SUP. CT. REv. 31, 35-36; Moskos & Chambers, supra note 176, at 9-12.
179 David Malament, Selective Conscientious Objection and the Gillette Decision, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 363, 373 (1972); Moskos & Chambers, supra note 176, at 10-11; Michael F.
NooneJr., Legal Aspects of Conscientious Objection: A Comparative Analysis, in THE NEW CONSCI-
ENTIOUS OBJECTION, supra note 175, at 177, 180.
180 Malament, supra note 179, at 374-75, 377; Moskos & Chambers, supra note 176, at
6-8, 12-14.
181 For discussion of this question, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
206-22 (1978); MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, VAR, AND CITI-
ZENSHIP 120-45 (1970).
182 Moskos & Chambers, supra note 176, at 5.
183 Often called "selective" COs. Id. The American Supreme Court upheld the denial
of exemption to selective COs in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In contrast,
selective objections qualify for exemption in other countries, such as Holland. Ben P. Ver-
meulen, Conscientious Objection in Dutch Law, in CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE EC COUN-
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tion: If a state wishes to exempt COs, however defined, how does it
distinguish between true COs and false ones? 18 4
This question involves the identification of intense preferences.
It is reasonable to assume that a vast number of people prefer not to
participate in wars. Many individuals oppose, and are even repulsed
by, the notion of killing and maiming others. From among this large
group of people, the state has to identify those whose opposition to
war is the strongest and thus would suffer the severest injury to their
conscience if forced to bear arms. 1 85
Historically, various methods were employed in this regard.
Some countries conditioned military exemption on payment, 186 on
providing a substitute willing to serve in one's place,' 87 or on willing-
ness to partake in a lengthier alternative civil service. 188 Nowadays,
however, the common technique is to demand reasons from putative
objectors. That is to say, the law does not suffice with a simple state-
ment of objection.' 8 9 Individuals seeking CO status must explain
their principles and present their arguments for examination. A com-
TRIES, supra note 175, at 259, 270-71. For a thorough discussion of this subject, see
generally Special Issue, Refusals to Serve-Political Dissent in the Israel Defense Forces, 36 ISR. L.
REv. 1 (2002).
184 Note that since 1973, the United States has abandoned the draft and adopted an
All-Volunteer Armed Force (AVF). John W. Chambers II, Conscientious Objectors and the
American State from Colonial Times to the Present, in THE NEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, supra
note 175, at 23, 43. Notwithstanding, even without conscription, the issue of conscientious
objection has practical importance with respect to uniformed members of the AVF seeking
discharge from the army. For discussion of the similar issues arising with respect to mili-
tary COs, see id. at 43-45; Noone, supra note 179, at 189-92; infra note 193 and accompa-
nying text.
185 See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453 (acknowledging "the hopelessness of converting a sin-
cere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man").
186 W,'ALZER, supra note 181, at 125 (noting that Quakers once paid money in lieu of
service); see also CONSTANCE BRAITHWAITE, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO VARIOUS COMPUL-
SIONS UNDER BRITISH LAW 109, 114-15 (1995) (describing the fine system for COs that
existed in Britain).
187 LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE EXPERIENCES OF CONSCI-
ENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN AMERICA THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 50-52 (Peter Brock ed., 2002)
(describing an eighteenth-century act authorizing the seizure of property in order to pay
substitutes, and listing items such as cattle and horses taken from Quakers who refused to
enroll); Chambers, supra note 184, at 23-24, 26.
188 In Denmark, the first CO law (enacted in 1917) provided that while the period of
military service is six and a half months, the duration of alternative civil service for COs is
twenty months. In 1933, the duration changed to, respectively, six and fifteen months.
Since 1973, however, the law lays down identical periods for both services. Erik Siesby,
Conscientious Objection in Danish Law, in CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE EC COUNTRIES,
supra note 175, at 159, 162-63. Similarly, Italian law used to require an alternative service
of double duration for COs, but this provision was struck down by the constitutional court.
Sergio Lariccia, Conscientious Objection in Italian Law, in CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN THE
EC COUNTRIES, supra note 175, at 113, 126-28.
189 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 186, at 377 (justifying the legal position requiring more
than mere statements by the temptation that would exist to falsely claim CO status); Los-
chelder, supra note 177, at 31 ("[T]he simple statement that a decision of conscience has
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mittee often interviews the objector, who must convince the panel of
the sincerity of her conscientious convictions. 190 Note that objectors
do not have to prove that their views are "correct" in any objective
sense.191 Rather, reasons are required in order to verify that the be-
liefs are genuinely and strongly held.192 Presumably, false COs would
find it much harder to offer persuasive reasons for their position and
are thus much more likely to fail the test. 193 In this way, reasons serve
as identifiers of intense preferences without penalizing the true hold-
ers of such preferences. Reasons-provision should not be costly or
burdensome for authentic COs, who are well aware, in advance, of the
justifications for their position. Moreover, requiring reasons-provision
helps locate strong preferences of a conscientious nature. In contrast,
methods like payment or willingness to perform a lengthier civil ser-
vice' 9 4 might identify intense preferences against military service that
are not based on conscientious grounds. 95
This role of the reasons-requirement can explain the historical
preference for religious COs and the more lenient exemption process
for members of certain religious sects. 196 When a person requesting
exemption is a lifelong member of a well-known religious group that
been made does not meet the requirements of legally binding effect and equality before
the law.").
190 Malament, supra note 179, at 377 ("The Selective Service System does not accept
claims to conscientious objection at face value. A personal statement, references, and an
interview are required."). Under German law, a person applying for CO exemption must
provide a statement of reasons and explain his decision in a convincing manner. As part of
the examination process, the applicant may be required to appear before a CO committee.
Loschelder, supra note 177, at 31-34. In a similar fashion, Dutch law requires an objector
to attend a hearing before a committee "who discusses with him his objections and argu-
ments." Vermeulen, supra note 183, at 276.
191 See CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL DISOBEDIENCE 156
(1992) (arguing that "freedom of conscience means the freedom to act on the dictates of
conscience for the sole reason that they are given by the conscience, regardless of their
justness or of the correctness of their contents"); Loschelder, supra note 177, at 31 (claim-
ing that the state may not judge a CO's decision "according to the categories of right or
wrong").
192 Loschelder, supra note 177, at 31-32; Malament, supra note 179, at 377-78.
193 In a similar fashion, a military CO seeking discharge from the army is required "to
establish his sincerity by offering persuasive reasons for his refusal to serve." Noone, supra
note 179, at 177, 190; see also Singer v. Secretary of the Air Force, 385 F. Supp. 1369, 1373
(D. Colo., 1974) (holding that a serviceman seeking discharge on ground of conscientious
objection bears the burden of proving his case under the relevant criteria, and that such
"burden is met when nonfrivolous allegations of fact are presented" (quoting Arlen v.
Laird, 345 F. Supp. 181, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1972))).
194 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
195 Thus, for instance, a rich coward may have strong preferences against participating
in wars of any kind.
196 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 186, at 374 (explaining the relative disadvantage of an
atheist or agnostic objector who-in contrast to members of Christian churches-was "not
regarded as part of a recognised system of beliefs," and so "had to defend his individual
beliefs and values and . . . was sometimes expected to be able to answer very difficult
questions of fundamental ethics").
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professes pacifism as a fundamental tenant, then the very fact of mem-
bership can serve as a proxy for intense preferences against army ser-
vice. This proxy is especially reliable when such membership
demands compliance with comprehensive and strict rules regarding
many aspects of daily life. It is unreasonable to imagine that unrelig-
ious individuals would join a community that so tightly (albeit infor-
mally) controls its members' lives, only to evade military service. 197
Furthermore, one may argue that true religious belief need not be
logical or consistent, and is not altered by rational persuasion)t 98 Re-
ligious "preferences" are largely exogenous in that sense. Therefore,
long-time adherence to a religion that clearly prohibits the bearing of
arms may serve as sufficient proof of intense and stable preferences in
this regard.
Secular conscientious objection is much more individualistic,
does not require membership in recognized groups, and is potentially
more receptive to argumentation. It is therefore harder to identify. 199
A thorough examination of the objectors' reasons may thus be neces-
sary to judge the authenticity of their beliefs. A reasons-requirement
may be more important in this case not because secular moral convic-
tions are typically less intensely held than religious ones.20 0 Rather,
reasons play a more pivotal role in the case of secular objectors be-
cause it is the best way to differentiate between sincere and insincere
objectors.
A reasons-requirement does not expose every false CO. Theoreti-
cally, a person who has no strong qualms about warfare may read the
relevant pacifistic literature and convincingly act out the CO role to
an impressed committee. Nevertheless, this risk should not be over-
stated. As our experience as theatergoers shows, good acting is a rare
commodity. impersonating a CO is not a simple feat. Potential
pretenders may thus balk at tackling this hurdle, or fail in the attempt.
In closing this discussion, I would like to point out that a reasons-
requirement somewhat narrows the gap between two influential theo-
197 The European Commission used such argumentation to support the differential
treatment ofJehovah's Witnesses, and their far-reaching exemption, even from a substitute
civil service. Vermeulen, supra note 183, at 280-81; see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 186, at
336 ("[F]ew people would become Quakers or Christadelphians or Jehovah's Witnesses
only in order to avoid military service: they would be deterred by the other obligations of
membership of these bodies.").
198 Cf Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)
(generally holding, with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, that "religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection").
199 See Malament, supra note 179, at 380 (noting that if church affiliation were the test,
then it would have been relatively easy to process CO applications).
200 WALZER, supra note 181, at 128 ("[A] moral code can be upheld as fervently as a
religious code .... ").
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retical approaches to legal issues: economic analysis and civic republi-
canism. Economic analysis of law embraces a preferences theory of
welfare, 20 1 and usually assumes that welfare maximization involves the
value-free process of satisfying people's actual preferences, regardless
of their content.2 02 Because well-being consists of giving people
whatever they happen to want, the state need not inquire about the
justification for preferences, 20 3 but bother only with the procedural
mechanisms that enable discovering, aggregating, and fulfilling peo-
ple's desires. 204 A radically different-and more modest-role is al-
lotted to preferences in the civic-republican tradition. Preferences
are merely a point of departure, not the end result for automatic im-
plementation. 20 5 In particular, republicans emphasize the impor-
tance of argument and deliberation. The strength of a person's
reasons for a certain preference and the effectiveness of one's persua-
sion determine the final outcome. 20 6
As explained in this section, "reasons" can serve an important
role in economic analysis as well. The GNP device of requiring rea-
sons for preferences helps determine their relative intensity and au-
thenticity. Offering compelling reasons for favoring one option over
another both establishes that strong preferences indeed exist and mit-
igates the risk of lies. Therefore, economic analysis of law would do
well to join civic republicanism in embracing inquiries into the rea-
sons underlying preferences. Awareness of the significance of reasons
would improve economic analysis's chances of achieving its goal of
welfare maximization. 20 7
201 Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 175 (2000).
202 Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 191, 199 (1999) (stating that standard economic theory determines a person's well-
being by the extent to which she satisfies her unrestricted preferences). For critical discus-
sion of preference theories of welfare, see Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 21, at 1677-1700.
203 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 194 (1993) ("Markets
are responsive only to given wants, without evaluating the reasons people have for wanting
the goods in question .... "); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPY,
LAw, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 39 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that in economic and cost-benefit
analysis "[t]he reasons people give for their views.., are not to be counted; what counts is
how much individuals will pay to satisfy their wants").
204 DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 72, 74 (1996).
205 ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 211 ("Politics is a domain for criticizing and changing
desires through reasoned debate, not merely for aggregating given desires."); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988) ("In the deliberative
process, private interests are relevant inputs into politics; but they are not taken as pre-
political and exogenous and are instead the object of critical scrutiny.").
206 ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 209-16; SAGOFF, supra note 203, at 27-29, 40-42,
55-57, 92-97; Sunstein, supra note 205, at 1548-51, 1554-55.
207 Admittedly, "reasons" would not be used for the same purposes in the two theories.
Under the civic republican approach, reasons are offered to convince others of the merits
of one's position and views. ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 211. In contrast, reasons will be
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F. General Comments
The rules discussed in this Part come from a wide range of legal
fields. They address such disparate issues as rights of first refusal, tak-
ings compensation, self-help remedies for possessors of property, se-
lection of adopting parents, redemption rights in secured
transactions, and exemptions for conscientious objectors. Yet, as we
have seen, they share important common features: all of them employ
some technique for identifying intense preferences. With the excep-
tion of the "reasons-requirement" device, the methods analyzed above
adopt a "generalized" approach that does not require ad-hoc exami-
nation of individual cases. That is to say, they generalize about cir-
cumstances in which strong preferences are likely to exist, and insert
the chosen proxies-possession, declining marginal utility, use value,
etc.-into the legal rule itself. These generalizations are based on ob-
servations, experience, or studies of human nature and behavior.
They represent judgments about what most people would feel or pre-
fer in certain scenarios. 20 8 More importantly, none of the devices dis-
cussed in this Part ("reasons" included) penalize individuals with
intense preferences. These methods do not detect strong preferences
by taxing the unique utility that some people derive from an entitle-
ment, and they do not require individuals to hand over some (or all)
of this special value as proof that intense preferences indeed exist.
This nonpenalizing feature is obvious in identifiers that do not
involve any payments or monetary sanctions. For instance, the proxy
of possession suffices to identify strong preferences with respect to
property, which justify a self-help remedy. 209 Similarly, the declining
marginal utility rule locates preference-intensity among prospective
adopting parents, 211 and a reasons-requirement reassures that consci-
entious objections are sincere (without placing a significant burden
on true objectors). 2 11 It is important to see, however, that nonpenal-
ization is a characteristic of the other identifiers discussed in this Part
employed in economic analysis to prove a person's sincerity and discourage or flush out
lies. One would usually not have to persuade that her preferences are "correct" in any
objective sense. Notwithstanding this difference in the "reasons for reasons," acceptance
of a reasons-examination will reduce the discord between economic analysis and civic re-
publicanism. Consequently, even under the former theory, preferences will not be taken
as given, but subjected to some scrutiny of their content.
208 See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPOR-
TANCE 113-17 (1986) (explaining, in the context of measuring different people's well-be-
ing, how knowledge of human nature, experience, and information about particular
persons' wants, enable us to make judgments regarding what most informed people de-
sire). Such judgments are inescapable in a world characterized by high transaction costs.
See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
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as well. Thus, although rights of redemption involve payments by a
redeemer who wishes to retain or regain her property, these payments
pertain to a former outstanding debt (in the case of redemption of a
collateral by a debtor), or to the market value of the property (in the
case of lost property). The owner's surplus value above market price
is left intact. Likewise, even though rights of first refusal entail a
purchase by the right holders, the price required is limited to the
third party's offer and does not include the incremental value of the
asset to the right holders.
At this point, one should note the differences between the gener-
alized and nonpenalizing (GNP) identifiers discussed in this Part and
Margaret Radin's conception of "personal property." According to
Radin's personhood theory of property, assets should be classified ac-
cording to their relation to personality and their contribution to peo-
ple's self-development and self-actualization. 212 The main distinction
is between "personal" property, the loss of which cannot be remedied
by its value equivalent or by a replacement (the family home, a wed-
ding ring, or a family portrait), and "fungible" property, which is eas-
ily replaceable by similar objects (money, a contractor's parcel of
undeveloped land, or a commercial landlord's apartment). Generally
speaking, Radin argues that greater protection should be given to per-
sonal property than to fungible property. 213 Preventing even the com-
pensated taking of a highly personal asset, such as the family home,
may be justified.214 In contrast, monetary compensation should al-
ways suffice for claims involving fungible property, and sometimes no
compensation is necessary.215
One may view Radin's notion of "personal property" as identify-
ing assets in relation to which strong preferences are held. This is
certainly true of a person's home. In this respect, Radin's per-
sonhood theory may arrive at similar conclusions and recommenda-
tions as those of the GNP proxy "use value vs. exchange value." GNP
212 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
213 See id. at 959-61, 986. These ideas are developed further in MargaretJane Radin,
The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1667, 1686-92 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Liberal Conception]; and MargaretJane Ra-
din, Residential Rent Control, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 362-65 (1986) [hereinafter Radin,
Rent Control].
214 Radin, supra note 212, at 1005-06 (explaining that the personhood theory may
protect the family home with a property rule, or condition the taking of personal property
on proof of compelling state interest and absence of less intrusive alternatives).
215 Id. at 988, 1014-15. Interestingly, the German takings jurisprudence similarly dis-
tinguishes between different types of property, granting broader protection to property
deemed necessary for individuals' self-development and self-realization. The more a prop-
erty right contributes to these goals, the greater the restrictions on state intervention, and
vice versa. For discussion of this "scaling function" under German law, see GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 113, 135-39 (2006).
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identifiers, however, are much broader in content and scope than the
category of "personal property."
First, the personhood theory is a theory of property law, whereas
GNP identifiers are potentially relevant and applicable to all types of
entitlements. Second, and more importantly, GNP identifiers may ac-
knowledge the existence of intense preferences even with respect to
property regarded as nonpersonal by personhood theory. The fact
that money can sufficiently compensate for an injury to fungible prop-
erty does not necessarily imply that intense preferences regarding it
do not exist, or that strong legal protection is superfluous. Thus, for
example, Radin will not categorize commercial assets-even a per-
son's business-as "personal."21 6 In addition, entitlements are re-
garded as "personal" only if enjoyed, in practice, for a significant
period of time and so have come to be bound up with the person. 217
In contrast, the GNP proxy of "possession" generally applies to all pos-
sessors of property21 8 and grants a self-help remedy also to a person
using force to prevent trespass to her place of business. A freshly dis-
possessed businessperson may justifiably have as strong a preference
for quick repossession as a person dispossessed from her residence.
Similarly, the GNP identifier of "declining marginal utility"justifies an
exemption in bankruptcy also for such fungible property as tools and
implements of business and trade or some minimal global sum of
money. 219 Although fungible, these resources are also significantly
more valuable in the hands of bankrupted debtors than in the hands
of their creditors. Furthermore, the declining marginal utility identi-
fier does not unjustifiably distinguish between currently enjoyed enti-
tlements and prospective ones. Therefore, it may allocate an
entitlement to adopt a healthy baby precisely to people who have not
yet experienced pnirenthond. 220 Finallv "r onn-rnirrnont"
216 See Radin, Liberal Conception, supra note 213, at 1691-92 (defending case law that
denies compensation for severe value reductions caused by downzoning, by the fact that
development rights are fungible property and the injured land is often held by its owner
for investment or commercial purposes); Radin, supra note 212, at 995-96 (justifying an
implied warranty of habitability in landlord-tenant law only with respect to residential
leases); Radin, Rent Control, supra note 213, at 359-65 (supporting rent control for residen-
tial tenancies and arguing that "preservation of one's home is a stronger claim than preser-
vation of one's business . . .noncommercial personal use of an apartment as a home is
morally entitled to more weight than purely commercial landlording").
217 SeeRadin, Rent Control, supra note 213, at 361-62 (explaining, in the context of rent
control, that the personhood theory applies only to residing tenants who have a strong
interest in maintaining a "well-established" home, and not to "would-be tenants" who have
not yet acquired a place of residence).
218 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 123-26, 133-34 and accompanying text.
220 As argued above, the preferences of infertile couples with no other children (either
biological or adopted) are likely to be the most intense. See supra notes 139-41and accom-
panying text.
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identifier is much less rigid than the personal/fungible dichotomy
and so more receptive to the subjective reasons that people offer in
support of the strength of their preferences. 22'
III
ASSESSMENT OF THE NONPENALIZING APPROACH
A. General
To assess GNP identifiers of intense preferences, this Part com-
pares the nonpenalizing approach with four alternatives. All the
methods discussed below are used in practice in certain circum-
stances; none are a theoretic fancy. I shall first briefly describe each
of the five identification methods and then compare them in terms of
their effectiveness in identifying preferences, their relative fairness
and equal treatment of preferences, their administrative costs, and
their ability to deal with objectionable intensities. The five methods
are:
1. Mouth. People can reveal their preference-intensity through
verbal statements. Such a method is currently used in public-opinion
studies, polls, consumer-product surveys, contingent-valuation ques-
tionnaires (CVM), 2 2 2 and Quality-Adjusted Life Year Surveys
(QALYs).223 People are asked to express the strength of their prefer-
ences in words, numbers, rankings, or hypothetical willingness to pay
for the attainment of certain outcomes. The important common de-
221 See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. The personhood theory draws a
sharp distinction between property for personal use and property for commercial and busi-
ness purposes, and thus would not accept a person's claim that the latter is personal-
rather than fungible-property. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
222 The questionnaire technique known as the contingent valuation method (CV or
CVM) tries to elicit people's responses regarding the additional costs they would hypotheti-
cally be willing to incur (in the form of monetary donations, higher taxes or bills, and the
like) in order to assure some level of a public good. People's responses may be given by
mail, telephone, or personal interviews, and their stated monetary values are then em-
ployed in a cost-benefit analysis. The CVM is used in practice with respect to such public
goods as environmental protection, cultural amenities, recreation, aesthetic values, and
health states. Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1882-85,
1888-90 (2006); KevinJ. Boyle, Contingent Valuation in Practice, in A PRIMER ON NONMARKET
VALUATION 111 (Patricia A. Champ et al. eds., 2003). For comprehensive reviews of the
CVM, see IAN J. BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH STATED PREFERENCE TECH-
NIQUES: A MANUAL (2002); ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING
SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989); CONTIN-
GENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (Jerry A. Hausman, ed., 1993).
223 A QALY is an interview technique that typically evaluates preferences for health
states in nonmonetary terms. Respondents are asked to describe how they would value
various health states and their answers are combined and ranked on a scale between 0
(death) and I (optimum health). Adler, supra note 222, at 1885-87; Robert Fabian, The
Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 118 (George Tol-
ley et al. eds., 1994).
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nominator of these methods is that they all rely upon-and suffice
with-individuals' statements.
2. Mouth and Purse (MP). This technique involves verbal state-
ments of preference-intensity backed up by monetary payments or
sanctions. Scholars suggest this method, for example, as a way of as-
sessing compensation when the state expropriates land.2 24 Accord-
ingly, owners' self-valuations would form the basis of takings
compensation. Owners, however, would have to pay property taxes
according to their assessment and refrain from selling their property
for less than the self-declared value. Owners selling below these values
would have to cede the difference. 225
3. Generalized and Nonpenalizing (GNP). This category includes
the identifiers that Part II discussed in detail: use value vs. exchange
value, possession, declining marginal utility, redemption, and reasons.
The major feature of these identifiers is that they do not tax, neither
in money nor in-kind, the exceptional utility that some people derive
from entitlements. Most of the nonpenalizing identifiers in this
group are generalized in that they do not require ad-hoc examination
of individual cases. The identifier of "reasons" necessitates case-spe-
cific inquiries, but does not sanction intense preferences. 226 As I will
demonstrate, although a reasons-requirement is case specific, it is in
many respects much closer to the generalized nonpenalizing devices
than to the other case-specific methods for identifying strong prefer-
ences. Therefore, I discuss "reasons" in the GNP category.
4. Generalized and Penalizing (GP). This method and the following
one are variations on the Mouth and Purse technique because they
involve significant taxation of the unique subjective utility that people
with strong preferences enjoy. GP techniques differ from MP tech-
niques in their use of generalizations. That is to say, one does not
detect intense preferences in an ad-hoc manner. The legal rule lays
down, ex ante, the circumstances in which such preferences are
deemed to exist. The sanction in this category is typically nonmone-
tary, 227 and a person's willingness to bear a cost identifies intense pref-
erences. For example, the state may require individuals to prove the
sincerity of their conscientious objection to military service by willing-
224 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
225 For a more detailed description, see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 191-93, 208-11 and accompanying text.
227 Here and elsewhere, I use the terms "nonmonetary" or "in-kind" in a narrow sense,
which denotes costs and burdens that are nonproprietaiy. That is to say, the penalty that this
technique demands of people with strong preferences is neither pecuniary nor in material
resources but rather in the sacrifice of time, honor, effort, etc., as the examples in the text
demonstrate.
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ness to partake in a longer civil service. 228 Similarly, one can condi-
tion a strong preference for receiving welfare benefits on willingness
to go through a grueling bureaucratic process involving lengthy form-
filling, personal interviews, and close scrutiny of eligibility by
officials. 229
5. Case Specific and Penalizing (CSP). This last method resembles
MP in its two major features: it identifies strong preferences on a case-
by-case basis and it imposes a cost on people with intense preferences.
Nevertheless, whereas in MP money figures both in people's self-valua-
tions and their subsequent payments or sanctions, the case-specific
"currency" of CSP is willingness to forgo a benefit in-kind. A prime
example is logrolling. When people vote, they ordinarily record only
their "bare" preference for one outcome over another. The relative
intensity of individuals' preferences for various outcomes is not re-
flected, and all votes receive equal weight.230 Because only the num-
ber of votes counts, a relatively apathetic majority can still defeat a
228 Rules that set twice-and even thrice-as long a period of alternative service have
existed in some European countries. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The dif-
ferent nature of the two services cannot plausibly justify such a vast difference between the
length of the military service and of the civil one. Not all forms of military service are
physically or mentally more demanding than an alternative service, such as in hospitals and
clinics for drug addicts. For this reason, the Italian constitutional court struck down a law
that required a twice-as-long civil service, as conflicting with the principle of equality. Lar-
iccia, supra note 188, at 126. Arguably, another way to prove the sincerity of conscientious
objection, is by willingness to go to jail for refusing to serve in the army. On imprisonment
of COs, see Moskos & Chambers, supra note 176, at 12; Chambers, supra note 184, at 38.
Obviously, a normative difference exists between these two examples of GP identifiers. By
offering the alternative of a longer civil service, the state recognizes the legitimacy of con-
scientious objection. In contrast, imprisonment of COs implies the illegitimacy and illegal-
ity of refusing to serve in the military. Nevertheless, a common denominator exists in both
examples: individuals prove the strength of their preferences against military service by
readiness to bear a substantial nonmonetary cost.
229 An example of a welfare payment of this kind is the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (2006). In a similar fashion, food stamps, housing
vouchers, and Medicaid cards may be seen as identifying strong preferences for welfare
benefits through people's readiness to bear stigmatization costs. Individuals may feel infer-
ior or shamed when revealing themselves to others as recipients of public assistance.
Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 847, 849, 891-93 (2002) (explaining the stigmatization caused by vouchers and food
stamps). In a different context, Gilo and Porat have argued that suppliers' boilerplate
contract provisions use the proxy of willingness to bear high transaction costs-such as
readiness to fill out complex and time-consuming documents-to discriminate between
consumer groups and target desirable buyers (repeat consumers, large customers, etc.).
David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic
Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH.
L. REv. 983, 989-92 (2006). Although not aimed at detecting intense preferences, these
standard-form clauses employ an in-kind penalizing device to identify a group with sought-
after characteristics.
230 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 132 (stating that in the simple majority
voting process "[a] man who is passionately opposed to a given measure and a man who is
slightly favorable but does not care greatly about it are given equal weight.. ."); VAN DEN
DOEL & vAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 7, at 108-09 (observing that each vote has equal value
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passionate minority, even if the minority's utility losses are greater
than the majority's utility gains. 231 Logrolling, a form of vote trading,
can address this problem. Essentially, in logrolling, parties exchange
their less intense desires for more urgent ones. Individuals who com-
prise a minority on a certain issue can convince persons belonging to
the majority to vote in favor of their intense preferences on that issue.
In return, the former will forgo a milder preference on a different
issue and vote according to the latter's wishes.232 This CSP technique
uses people's readiness to bear the cost of not realizing a weaker pref-
erence to identify strong preferences. 233 Although logrolling, unlike
the other methods described above, is a private method for identify-
ing and realizing intense preferences, it is nevertheless worth discuss-
ing along with the alternative, state-employed identifiers because of its
unique features.
Having described the various methods of identifying intense pref-
erences, we can now assess their relative strengths and weaknesses.
We shall begin with their effectiveness in identifying true preferences.
B. Effectiveness
The first criterion for assessing a method for identifying strong
preferences is its ability to attain its goal, and in particular to mitigate
the risk of strategic misrepresentations. The concern that people
might lie about the intensity of their preferences is genuine. Even if
people ordinarily tell the truth (for ethical reasons or to establish a
reputation of honesty), it is sufficient that there are some people who
would lie about the intensity of their preferences to warrant some lie-
avoidance mechanism in any method for identifying intense
preferences.
The Mouth method, relying solely on verbal statements, is the
only one of our five that does not include any lie-avoidance device.
This fact may explain why this method is used mainly to elicit prefer-
ences regarding general policy issues and the provision of public
goods (environmental protection, public health policy and the
like).234 Public goods simultaneously benefit numerous people and
are typically funded through government taxation. Because both the
benefits and the costs of public goods are widely spread throughout
society, the incentive to lie on questionnaires or public opinion polls
and that "[t]he problem of preference intensity is especially important in those cases
where a relatively apathetic majority is faced by a passionate minority").
231 See Hardy Lee Wieting, Jr., Philosophical Problems in Majority Rule and the Logrolling
Solution, 76 ETHICS 85, 86-87 (1966).
232 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 132-33; Wieting, supra note 231, at 87.
233 See RIKER, supra note 16, at 157 (" [V] ote-trading requires that traders vote contrary
to their true tastes on some issues.").
234 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
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is significantly diluted. 235 In contrast, if all benefits and costs are con-
centrated on a single individual, self-valuations are much less reliable.
Thus, for instance, we would not rely on verbal statements of landown-
ers alone in awarding them takings compensation, or solely on self-
assessments of tort injurers to set the damages they would subse-
quently have to pay.
Of the remaining four techniques, MP initially seems to clearly
surpass all others as a lie-avoidance mechanism. If, for example, the
government uses landowners' assessments not only for compensation
purposes but also for taxing their property, and if it fully penalizes
subsequent sales below self-declared values, then landowners' incen-
tives to misrepresent their valuation are greatly reduced. 236 The other
methods mitigate lies in nonmonetary ways and so may offer only
"rougher" guarantees of truthfulness. GNP methods, for example,
employ proxies that are thought to identify instances of strong prefer-
ences, such as possession, declining marginal utility, and use value.
Although these proxies are generally accurate, exceptions cannot be
ruled out. GP and CSP use people's willingness to bear costs as proof
of preference-intensity. But the readiness of conscientious objectors
to serve a longer civil service, or the willingness of welfare recipients to
undergo an exhausting eligibility-scrutiny process, 237 only proves that
their utility from satisfying the preference is greater than the cost in-
flicted upon them. Thus, the GNP, GP, and CSP methods do not ex-
pose the precise extent to which some people's preferences are more
intense than those of others.
On further reflection, MP's superiority on the lie-avoidance front
appears to be somewhat less impressive. First, in numerous contexts,
people's exact valuations are unimportant. Leaving aside scenarios
that require monetary compensation and taxation (where precise esti-
mations are desirable), it usually suffices to detect the very existence
of strongly held preferences. If adequately crafted, GNP, GP, and CSP
are all capable of attaining this goal quite effectively. Thus, for exam-
ple, if according to the rule of declining marginal utility, some mini-
mal quantity of wealth is much more valuable in the hands of
235 This section focuses on the problem of lying and does not address the different
question whether people-who do not wish to lie-are indeed capable of giving accurate
or meaningful monetary valuations of their preferences for non-marketed and public
goods. For a skeptical view see, for example, Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein,
Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 82 (1995) (stating with respect to
contingent valuation that "it is difficult to believe that people answering hypothetical ques-
tions can assign meaningful dollar values to various possible health or other risks"); see also
ELSTER, supra note 136, at 221 (questioning people's ability to accurately report the relative
strength of their preferences even in nonmonetary ways). A negative answer to this ques-
tion strengthens the case for nonmonetary identifiers of intense preferences.
236 Though not eliminated. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
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bankrupt debtors than in the hands of their creditors, then this phe-
nomenon justifies a property exemption in bankruptcy, regardless of
the exact ratio between the debtor's utility from this minimal quantity
and the creditors' utility from getting this additional quantity. 238 Sec-
ond, the relative advantage of MP is limited to assets that are regularly
traded in markets and taxed by the state. Only then is it potentially
possible to place a relatively accurate price tag on preferences. 23 9
This precision is lost once MP is applied to preferences for nontraded
or nontaxed entitlements, such as conscientious objector status or ba-
bies for adoption. Because these entitlements cannot be sold or taxed
according to people's self-assessments, one cannot employ monetary
sanctions to encourage truth telling. Third, and more generally, the
problem of lies should not be overstated. Even if some people have
no moral scruples against lying, it will not always be easy to lie success-
fully. Lying often requires reliable information about the preferences
of others.240 To the extent that people do not (or cannot) exploit
opportunities to lie, the practical importance of MP's lie-discourage-
ment mechanism diminishes. To sum up, the goal of lie mitigation
does not unequivocally tilt the scales in favor of the MP method. With
the exception of the Mouth technique, the other methods quite suc-
cessfully avoid untruthful preference-intensities.
C. Equal and Fair Treatment of Intense Preferences
This section compares the degree to which the five methods treat
people and their truthful preferences equally and fairly. Three pa-
rameters will be considered:
28 See supra notes 1 13-4 and accompanying tet
239 On the possibility of employing monetary sanctions in the takings compensation
context, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. See also supra note 44, where I
questioned whether individuals can accurately quantify their subjective valuation of an as-
set when they do not contemplate its real market sale. Arguably, people do not have a
precise, abstract reservation price that is independent of the timing and circumstances of
the asset's transfer and the then-prevailing market prices. If so, then MP's quest to reveal
the truthful "magic" number is likely to be futile.
240 See VAN DEN DOEL & VAN VELTHOVEN, supra note 7, at 99 ("A necessary prerequisite
for successful strategic voting behaviour is that the individual is completely informed of the
preferences of the other group members and on their voting behaviour .... This condi-
tion will seldom or never be met."); Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for
Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92J. POL. ECON. 991, 1005 (1984)
(claiming, in the context of procedures for assigning medical interns to hospitals accord-
ing to both parties' preferences, that "if agents have little information about the prefer-
ences of other agents, they will not in general be able to determine an 'optimal'
misrepresentation"). Gathering and processing the relevant information is especially diffi-
cult with respect to public goods, which potentially affect numerous people. See Adler,
supra note 222, at 1926-27 (arguing with respect to welfare polls (such as CVM and QULY)
that because people are not fully rational, they "may not realize that lying is in their inter-
est or may not be up to the cognitive strain of keeping track of their lies").
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1. Dignity and Respect How does the technique fare in terms of
treating individuals with dignity and respect? Is there anything humil-
iating, insulting or disrespectful in the way in which the method iden-
tifies intense preferences?24'
2. Wealth Effects: Is the technique biased in favor of people who
are able to pay? If so, nonwealthy individuals would not have a fair
and equal chance of proving the strength of their preferences.
3. Equality of Treatment Does the technique impose heavier bur-
dens on individuals with strong preferences than on people with
weaker preferences? Does it arbitrarily single out certain people
within the strong-preferences group for differential treatment?
The second and third parameters are not identical. Even assum-
ing that people are equally affluent, or that the burden imposed in
detecting preference-intensity is nonmonetary (and thus can be borne
by rich and poor alike), it may still be unfair to place a heavier burden
only on certain people. Ideally, we should seek identification meth-
ods that are not contingent upon individuals' willingness to bear sanc-
tions because those methods facilitate free and full enjoyment of the
exceptionally high utility these individuals derive from entitle-
ments. 242 Any dilution of this value-by requiring monetary payments
or by inflicting costs in-kind-is prima facie undesirable.
In support of this claim, recall that the sanctions used in this con-
text are merely a means for detecting strong preferences. The sanc-
tions are an unintentional and undesirable byproduct of the
identification process. Penalization only dissipates value or transfers it
to recipients who cannot be regarded as deserving under any plausi-
ble redistributive theory. Therefore, when sufficiently reliable identi-
fication can be attained without inflicting sanctions, one can-and
should-forgo unnecessary penalizing.
Take the case of a spouse who co-owns the couple's residence,
and whose partner initiates partition proceedings in which the prop-
erty would be sold as a whole. 243 We could force the noninitiating
spouse to prove the intensity of her preferences by actually outbidding
any third party wishing to purchase the property. But why should we
do so? It is highly probable that the noninitiating spouse wishes to
continue using the property and values it more than other persons. 244
Were no sale imposed upon her, she would have continued enjoying
her unique, subjective value in full. Requiring her to negotiate a
241 All else being equal, we should opt for the method that is least injurious to people's
dignity.
242 An important qualification to this goal is the case of unfair or objectionable prefer-
ence-intensities. See infra Part III.E.
243 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
244 Due to the difference between use value and exchange value, as explained supra
notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
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purchase only squanders this value. Neither the spouse initiating the
partition (who, in any case, is willing to sell for the lower price offered
in the market), nor the third party, has a legitimate expectation to
receive part of the other spouse's above-market value. A statutory
right of first refusal in this context-which suffices with a matching of
the third party's offer-transfers the property to the person who val-
ues it most, and minimizes transaction costs. It thereby assures that
the largest efficiency gains remain and averts the risk of bargaining
failure. The nonpenalizing identifier is thus both more fair and more
efficient. Moreover, since ex ante both spouses may find themselves in
either the position of the initiator of the partition or of the noninitiat-
ing party, a statutory RFR benefits them both.
Note that this nonpenalizing feature also characterizes a well-
functioning market. In a competitive market, prices are not set and
assets are not allocated according to a "highest bidder" criterion.
Rather, prices reflect the value of the marginal owner. All consumers
pay the same amount for each unit of a good they purchase, from the
first to the last, and this amount is set according to the worth of the
last unit.2 4 5 The difference between the utility people derive from a
good and its market price is their consumer surplus, which they are
allowed to keep. 246 Thus, in a well-functioning market all prefer-
ences-including intense ones-are treated equally. Individuals are
not required to reveal their unique valuation of an asset beyond its
market price, and this value is not-either partially or wholly-taxed
away. Keeping the extent of subjective valuation private affords peo-
ple equal opportunities to enjoy utility from goods and to maintain
their economic advantage in future negotiations with others.247 More-
over, it reduces (although does not eliminate) the bias of markets
against nonaffluent individuals, since not all the value that these peo-
ple enjoy must be paid for. I believe that this characteristic of markets
is commendable and one we should retain whenever possible.248 All
245 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 111, at 95-96.
246 SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 111, at 96-98; see also BUCHANAN & TULLOCK,
supra note 6, at 111 ("There is nothing in the market process which requires the participat-
ing individual to reveal the extent of his 'consumer's or seller's surplus.'").
247 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1886-88 (2000) (arguing, in the context of expectation damages in contracts,
that revealing private information about the true value of performance to the promisee
would weaken her bargaining position in future negotiations and enable other parties to
extract a greater share of the bargaining surplus).
248 True, even in markets, assets are sometimes allocated through auctions. If assets
are eventually given to the highest bidder, potential buyers would have to bid closer to
their actual valuation of an asset. Consequently, they would be able to retain a much
smaller consumer surplus. However, the existence of auctions does not detract from my
argument. First, allocation by auction is the exception, not the rule. Auctions are held
with respect to objectively unique assets-such as a Picasso painting-and when a competi-
tive market does not exist. Moreover, in such cases, we have no other way of knowing
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else being equal, when choosing a technique for identifying intense
preferences we should opt for the one that mimics the egalitarian fea-
ture of markets.
Let us now turn to examine how the five methods fare in light of
these parameters of evaluation. 249 The conclusions of the compara-
tive analysis are summarized in Table 1 below (which also includes the
effectiveness aspect discussed in the previous section).
TABLE 1
Technique for Identifying Mitigating Dignity and Overcoming Wealth Equal Treatment
Intense Preferences Risk of Lies Respect Disparities of Preferences
Mouth: Verbal Statements No Yes Yes Yes
Only
Mouth and Purse (MP): Yes No No No
Statements with Monetary
Payments or Sanctions
Generalized and Largely Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nonpenalizing (GNP)
Generalized and Penalizing Largely Yes No Yes No
(GP)
Case Specific and Largely Yes Partially Yes Yes No
Penalizing (CSP)
Dignity and Respect. All methods for identifying intense prefer-
ences can be placed along the continuum between the two poles of
"humiliation" and "respect." The Mouth technique, ranked last ac-
cording to the "lies mitigation" parameter, ranks first here. We re-
spect individuals and preserve their dignity to the greatest extent
when we accept their statements regarding preference-intensity as a
given.2 50 By honoring those statements the state conveys the message:
"We believe you and will act accordingly."
GNP methods "tie" in first place with Mouth, or at least follow
closely behind. This is because they too do not identify intense prefer-
ences via (monetary or nonmonetary) sanctions. 25 1 Furthermore,
which of the many potential buyers is the highest valuer. In contrast, in scenarios where an
entitlement is only subjectively unique to a certain person, or where there are good proxies
for systematically intense preferences on behalf of a specific party or side alone, we should
elect to mimic the market rule, rather than the exception. Second, people participate in
auctions voluntarily and are not compelled to enter a bidding competition. In contrast,
many situations calling for identification of intense preferences are forced upon the individ-
uals whose preferences need to be evaluated. Such is the case, for example, in takings
compensation or a partition sale that was not initiated by all the co-owners.
249 For convenience purposes, I discuss other parameters of evaluation separately.
Thus, for example, I compare the implementation costs of various identification methods
infra Part III.D.
250 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
251 For an explanation of why GNP identifiers are nonpenalizing, see supra notes
208-11 and accompanying text.
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even if requirements included in some GNP techniques may poten-
tially question people's integrity, they do so only marginally. For in-
stance, although one may claim that requiring reasons for preferences
expresses some degree of mistrust, it can hardly be argued that this
requirement is considerably insulting or humiliating.
The MP, GP, and CSP techniques are found closer to the "humili-
ation" pole because they entail penalties in order to flush out untruth-
ful preference-intensities. In this respect, however, CSP methods are
much less derogatory than MP or GP ones. Take, for example, the
CSP method of logrolling.252 Although individuals must forgo the sat-
isfaction of a certain preference in order to ensure the fulfillment of a
more urgent one, they experience much control in deciding which
preference to trade. Personal responsibility and lack of direct govern-
mental intervention may lessen any hurt feelings. In contrast, both
MP and GP methods involve infliction of sanctions by the state. Conse-
quently, the connection between these burdens and distrust of people
is conspicuous and disrespectful. For instance, although the MP
method seemingly shows interest in owners' valuation statements, it
concomitantly casts doubt on their integrity by informing them that
they will be closely monitored henceforth and any future sale below
the stated value will be taxed at a one hundred percent rate. 253
In a similar fashion, GP methods verify sincerity by people's will-
ingness to bear a significant sanction or stigmatization. Moreover,
there is an inherent tension between the goal of the penalty and its
effect. For instance, assuming the state wishes to exempt conscien-
tious objectors (COs) from military service, it must distinguish be-
tween false COs and true ones. Adoption of a GP technique in this
context means that the state will require alleged COs to prove their
sincerity by "paying the price," such as serving a much longer alterna-
tive civil service.254 By submitting to the penalty, genuine COs pass
252 See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
253 In addition to being disrespectful, by implying that people are likely to lie about
their preference-intensities, MP methods may actually decrease the incidence of voluntary
truth telling. Dan Kahan has argued that most individuals behave cooperatively when they
perceive that others are doing the same and uncooperatively when they believe that others
are shirking. Regulatory measures that stress the penalties for noncooperation imply that
people are not cooperating voluntarily, and this message inspires distrust and weakens
individuals' inclination to cooperate. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72-77 (2003). Thus, for instance, dramatically pub-
licizing the penalties for tax evasion causes people to infer that tax evasion is rampant.
This inference triggers a motive to evade, which may prevail over the material incentive
(caused by the penalties) to comply. Id. at 81-83. In the present context, when a tech-
nique for identifying intense preferences conspicuously treats individuals as probable liars,
it signals that dishonesty is the norm and truthfulness is for suckers.
254 See Avi Sagi & Ron Shapira, Civil Disobedience and Conscientious Objection, 36 ISR. L.
REv. 181, 212-13 (2002) (arguing that COs should be willing to bear personal sacrifices, in
the form of prison terms, in order to express the genuineness, force, and validity of their
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the test. But once proven to be true COs, their punishment seems
unjust since only false COs deserve to be punished. Likewise, welfare
benefits are sometimes conditioned on putative recipients undergo-
ing an unpleasant and grueling bureaucratic process. 255 Arguably, the
willingness to suffer a humiliating administrative process identifies
those persons whose preferences for the benefits are the most urgent
and intense. But once these people's identities are established, their
degrading treatment seems grossly unfair; worthy recipients should
not be disrespectfully treated.256
Wealth Effects. Only a method using monetary sanctions to iden-
tify intense preferences involves the problem of wealth effects.2 57
Therefore, only the MP method is biased against nonwealthy individu-
als because it prevents them from having a fair and equal chance to
prove their preferences' strength. The remaining four methods do
not require people to pay over some (or all) of the exceptional value
they receive from entitlements, and so do not suffer from this bias.
This advantage is obvious with respect to the two techniques that
adopt nonpenalizing identifiers and so do not require any transfers of
wealth: Mouth and GNP.258 Note, however, that the same conclusion
holds true for GP and CSP methods as well. Although penalizing,
both GP and CSP methods involve nonmonetary burdens. Since indi-
viduals can prove the intensity of their preferences by bearing costs in-
values); Vermeulen, supra note 183, at 272-73 (claiming, in the context of exemption for
COs, that the only decisive test of truthfulness is willingness to bear negative consequences,
but admitting that this test may be incompatible with the freedom of conscience); cf
Eduardo Mois~s Pefialver & Sonia K Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1095,
1158-60 (2007) (explaining, with respect to civil right activists participating in "sit-ins" at
segregated lunch counters, that to legitimize their trespass would undermine the expres-
sive value of their civil disobedience and willingness to accept punishment).
255 For criticism of welfare payments with humiliating eligibility requirements, see
Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in the Child Welfare
System, 61 MD. L. REv. 386, 394-402, 411-17 (2002).
256 The existence and degree of disrespect may vary according to different parameters.
For instance, a sanction inflicted face to face (such as a humiliating interview) can be more
injurious than a sanction imposed impersonally (such as through the filling of lengthy
forms). Often, the offensiveness of any measure is inversely correlated to the size of the
penalized group. It stands to reason that humiliation is greater when individuals perceive
themselves to be singled out for derogatory treatment, as opposed to a situation in which
everybody gets the same treatment. In this respect, MP and GP techniques are likely to be
regarded as insulting since they do not apply to all people with strong preferences, but
rather target a specific subgroup (owners of land considered for expropriation, potential
recipients of welfare benefits, etc.).
257 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (providing an explanation as to why
even GNP identifiers that involve some payments still leave the unique surplus enjoyed by
persons with intense preferences intact, in their hands).
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kind, these methods are potentially available to the nonaffluent as
well.
2 5 9
Indeed, if lack of money is also a proxy for lack of education and
political involvement, then nonmonetary identifiers would not ensure
equal opportunities for the poor.260 A relatively poor person may not
participate in logrolling and may not be sufficiently educated to pro-
vide persuasive reasons for conscientious objection. 26 1 This problem
should not be overstated, however. There are well-known historical
examples of successful conscientious objection or political opposition
by people not belonging to the upper or middle classes, such as the
Jehovah's Witnesses and the Black Muslims. 262 Although nonmone-
tary identifiers are no remedy for economic, educational, or social
gaps, they remove at least one significant obstacle on the way to estab-
lishing intense preferences. Furthermore, GNP methods do not ordi-
narily require a special initiative or active claim of preference-intensity
on behalf of the individual-an added advantage of GNP. Proxies like
possession, declining marginal utility, or use value vs. exchange value
are embodied in the legal rule itself and automatically activated in
259 For instance, a nonwealthy CO would not be able to offer money to prove her
intense preferences against carrying arms but could bear the nonmonetary cost of a
lengthier civil service.
260 Ren~e A. Irvin & John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth
the Effort?, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 55, 59 (2004) (noting that citizen participation committees
are overpopulated with members from high socio-economic groups who have a college
education); Richard D. Shingles, Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing
Link, 75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 76, 76 (1981) ("Low-income groups are generally politically
inactive. This is particularly true of more demanding forms of political participation, such
as campaign work and organized community activities which require scarce human re-
sources and high levels of individual initiative."). In a similar vein, it was claimed that
political deliberation favors the more articulate, well-educated, and affluent, and is thus
biased against racial minorities and poor people. Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25
POL. THEORY 347, 348-49, 352-54, 369-70 (1997).
261 WALZER, supra note 181, at 142-44 (arguing that exemption of COs may introduce
a class bias into the draft since such opposition is usually raised by the middle and upper
classes); Noone, supra note 179, at 185 (claiming that the exemption process for COs is
biased in favor of the well-educated and articulate). See also David A. Super, Offering an
Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J.
815, 853-54 (2004) (arguing that a complex and time-consuming administrative process
for receiving welfare benefits may have regressive effects since it "is likely to depend on the
claimant's literacy, math ability, organizational and social skills, and childcare and trans-
portation resources").
262 WALZER, supra note 181, at 143. Furthermore, some studies have found that ethnic-
ity and political culture have greater impact than socioeconomic status on levels of political
participation. Dale C. Nelson, Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status As Sources of Participation:
The Case for Ethnic Political Culture, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1024, 1031-37 (1979) (finding, in
the context of non-electoral political behavior-such as joining community organizations,
signing petitions, and attending demonstrations-that ethnicity is the best predicator of
variance in local political activity); Shingles, supra note 260, at 76-77, 87-90 (with the
exception of voting behavior, the political participation of blacks is significantly higher
than expected given their average education and income levels, and it is higher than the
political activity of whites of comparable socioeconomic status).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
appropriate circumstances. Thus, for example, exemptions in bank-
ruptcy will be uniformly afforded to all debtors and the defense of
self-help will protect all possessors of property.263 In this way, GNP
methods reduce any bias against the less educated or politically aware.
Equality of Treatment. An identifier meets this criterion to the ex-
tent that it does not impose heavier burdens on people with intense
preferences (vertical equity), and treats all individuals having strong
preferences equally (horizontal equity). As explained above, an ideal
method of identification would allow people to freely and fully enjoy
the high utility they derive from entitlements. 264 Only the nonpenal-
izing techniques-Mouth and GNP-pass both vertical and horizontal
equity tests. They alone mimic the well-functioning market in permit-
ting everyone to retain their consumer surplus. 265 Furthermore, in
doing so, they afford all people with intense preferences equal
chances of enjoyment. All the proxies that GNP methods employ (use
value, possession, declining marginal utility, redemption, and rea-
sons), apply generally to, and to the benefit of, every person with
strong preferences. In contrast, MP, GP, and CSP methods are penal-
izing, that is, they impose costs on people with intense preferences
only.2 66 In addition, MP and CSP methods apply haphazardly to per-
sons belonging to the strong-preferences group and are thus discrimi-
natory. 267 For example, the MP method of self-assessments backed up
by monetary payments would not affect all property owners with high
subjective valuation but only those who own land that is considered
for expropriation. 268 Similarly, the CSP technique of logrolling would
not be available in practice to all wishing to use it,269 but only to voters
who have preferences they can exchange and that other parties are
interested in. That is to say, if a person wishes to recruit additional
votes for an intensely held preference, she must have a weaker prefer-
ence she is willing to trade and a trading partner who strongly values
it. These will not always be available. 270
263 See, respectively, notes 121-28, 96-100 and accompanying text.
264 See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
265 For further explanation, see supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
266 See supra Part III.A.
267 This horizontal equity problem does not plague the GP technique. Because it is a
generalized-rather than case specific-identification method, its nonmonetary burden
would apply to everyone belonging to the intensely-held-preferences group. For instance,
all people with strong preferences for welfare benefits will be subject to a close-scrutiny
eligibility process. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
269 It stands to reason that some people would find the very idea of vote trading dis-
tasteful and would not engage in logrolling. See Wieting, supra note 231, at 92.
270 See id. at 94 (explaining that people with strong preferences on a great many issues
and weak preferences on only a few will have little to trade with, making logrolling unsuc-
cessful); see also RIKER, supra note 16, at 157 ("[I]f the same absolute majority passes two
motions, no trade is available."); Goodin, supra note 41, at 319 (acknowledging possibility
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In summary, the above analysis and Table 1 clearly demonstrate
that the GNP method is the superior method. In fact, generalized
and nonpenalizing identifiers are the only identifiers that effectively
mitigate the risk of lies and at the same time treat people with dignity
and respect, afford equal treatment to their preferences, and do not
favor the affluent. All alternative methods for identifying intense pref-
erences were found to be lacking in one or more of these aspects.
The Mouth and MP methods are mirror images of one another. The
advantages of Mouth are the shortcomings of MP and vice versa. The
former suffices with verbal statements and therefore contains no lie-
avoidance mechanism (although it fares well on the other parame-
ters). The advantage of MP is its strong incentives for truthful revela-
tion of intense preferences. This advantage comes at a heavy price
since MP fails the remaining tests. The GP and CSP techniques
achieve mixed results. On the one hand, they deal satisfactorily with
the problem of wealth effects and contain lie-mitigation devices. On
the other hand, these methods do not afford equal treatment to pref-
erences and are (to varying degrees) disrespectful toward people.
D. Implementation Costs
The attractiveness of any method for identifying intense prefer-
ences depends, among other things, on its implementation costs.
When considering the costs of GNP methods, one should differentiate
between "reasons-giving" and other GNP identifiers. The former re-
quires case-specific inquiries about the reasons underlying people's
preferences. The latter employs generalized proxies for intense pref-
erences that do not necessitate such examinations. Proxies like use
value, possession, declining marginal utility, and redemption are em-
bodied in ale legal rue itself. Dispensing witl tle C-eed f0i case-by-
case assessments significantly reduces implementation costs.27 1 Al-
though requiring reasons for preferences entails more costs, these
should not be especially high. Judges and decisionmakers do not
have to determine whether the reasons are "correct" in any objective
sense. Rather, the role of reasons is to convince that the alleged
of "persistent minoritie', who are always in the losing coalition"). In addition, present votes
cannot be exchanged for future ones if the parties do not know when the next voting
opportunity will take place, or if the voting is by secret ballot, making it impossible to
check whether voting promises are kept. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 6, at 132.
271 Indeed, generalized proxies may often be the only feasible solution for regulators
and decisionmakers who lack knowledge of individuals' utility functions and resources to
verify them. See GRIFFIN, supra note 208, at 122 (arguing, in the context of welfare promo-
tion by the state, that "governments would in general compare different citizens' well-be-
ing by appeal to things that it is assumed they all value"); Arneson, supra note 8, at 188 ("In
many contexts of practical importance the best an agent of society can do in order to
determine what a particular person prefers is to impute to that person the preferences that
most people share.").
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strong preferences are genuine. It therefore suffices that the reasons
offered are sincere and reasonable. 272
Like GNP methods, GP techniques involve generalized identifiers.
Hence, they too dispense with the need for expensive case-specific in-
quires, thereby reducing administrative costs. However, since GP
identifiers impose sanctions on holders of intense preferences, and
such imposition may involve substantial costs, they typically involve
greater costs than GNP techniques.
CSP methods-such as logrolling-seem inexpensive because
they rely on voluntary bargaining by individuals.273 People trade their
weaker preferences for stronger ones by themselves, and there is no
need for state involvement through courts or public officials. Yet,
shifting costs from public institutions to the individual bargainer does
not mean the costs disappear. The costs of the trading process, in-
cluding information gathering and negotiation, are not insignificant.
Individuals need to seek out potential trading partners, and there is
no predetermined "market price" for this type of preference.
Generally speaking, Mouth and MP methods are likely to require
relatively higher administrative costs than the other three methods be-
cause they call for case-by-case handling by administrative agencies.
Although the Mouth method suffices with verbal statements of indi-
viduals, it involves the gathering and processing of information from
numerous people, in the form of public opinion surveys, polls, contin-
gent valuation questionnaires and the like. 274 MP methods entail
even greater costs, because they also incur the cost of monitoring peo-
ple's future behavior to impose the monetary sanctions that ensure
truth telling. For example, in the compensation-for-takings context,
the lie-mitigating requirement that land not be sold for less than own-
ers' self-declared values necessitates stringent monitoring of real es-
tate transactions and collection of any discrepancies between declared
values and (lower) sale prices.275
In summary, the GNP technique is not only superior to other
methods in terms of equal and fair treatment of intense preferences,
but also attains this goal at relatively low administrative costs. At the
very least, no other technique seems preferable in this regard.
272 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
273 On decentralization as a partial solution to the problem of high administrative
costs, see CAIABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 41, at 36, 53-54.
274 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; see also Holland & Vaughn, supra
note 29, at 99 ("A major objection to all assessment schemes, . . . particularly to self-assess-
ment, lies in the great difficulty of determining the 'true' value of real estate. So difficult is
this valuation that it is entirely possible that, for a good many properties, professionals
would have to be employed at a cost greater than or equal to the cost of government
assessment. Thus, the administrative advantage of self-assessment would be spurious, for it
would merely involve shifting costs from government to individuals.").
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E. Dealing with Unfair and Objectionable Intensities
The different identifiers of intense preferences should also be as-
sessed according to their ability to contend with unfair and objection-
able preference-intensities. This concern comes in various forms. It
has been argued that due to their character and temperament, some
people have a general tendency to "feel strongly" about their prefer-
ences. It seems unfair to favor these people-for instance, in allocat-
ing scarce resources-over people who lack such a disposition.276 By
the same token, one should be careful not to create an allocation bias
in favor of people who are exceptionally efficient consumers of goods
and therefore derive systematically greater value from resources than
others. 277 This problem may exist even when no strategic behavior is
involved, but has the potential to intensify if people possess some con-
trol over the formation of their preferences. 278 If we take strength of
preferences into account, we encourage people to deliberately de-
velop intense preferences, in order to increase their chances of win-
ning entitlements. 279 This activity not only lacks social value but also
needlessly increases the injury to those who would not receive entitle-
ments. Finally, even ignoring the former problems, certain intensities
can be viewed as downright objectionable. Even if the content of the
276 RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 252 (1979) (arguing
that favoring the person with the more intense preferences is problematic "if Mr. X hap-
pens to want a great many things more than Mr. Y, and perhaps more intensely"); see also
ELSTER, supra note 136, at 219 (claiming that "natural tempers" should not be a factor in
compensation and allocation decisions).
277 See Goodin, supra note 41, at 318 (describing the super-efficient individual "who is
very good indeed at converting material commodities into subjective utility," and the prob-
lem that the goal of total utility maximization requires that virtually all material goods be
Allocated to such "pleasure machines"); see also T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J.
PHIL. 655, 663 (1975) (arguing that indiscriminate consideration of people's subjective
preference-intensities "would leave us open to being 'held up' by people ... who attached
inordinate importance to some relatively minor concern").
278 For the view that individuals are at least partially capable of mastering and adjust-
ing their preferences, see Arneson, supra note 8, at 175. See alsoJohn Rawls, A Kantian
Conception of Equality, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 254, 261 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999) ("We are assuming that people are able to control and to revise their wants and
desires in the light of circumstances and that they are to have responsibility for doing
so .... Persons do not take their wants and desires as determined by happenings beyond
their control. We are not, so to speak, assailed by them, as we are perhaps by disease and
illness so that wants and desires fail to support claims to the means of satisfaction in the
way that disease and illness support claims to medicine and treatment."). The physically
and mentally handicapped may have involuntary costly preferences because they some-
times require more resources than the healthy in order to attain a similar level of welfare.
RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 59-62
(2000).
279 The literature has discussed the somewhat analogous problem of people who freely
choose to cultivate expensive preferences and therefore unfairly require more resources to
maintain the same preference-satisfaction level as persons with more modest desires.
DWORKIN, supra note 278, at 48-59; Arneson, supra note 8, at 176, 185-94; Scanlon, supra
note 277. at 659-66.
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preference is inoffensive-not being racist, malicious, prejudiced, or
the like 28 0-the enormous intensity of the preference may be re-
garded as preposterous. 281 Although people are certainly allowed to
differ in the intensity of their desires, this continuum of rising utility
has reasonable limits. The socially acceptable level of preference-in-
tensity is not infinite. To take an extreme example, students partici-
pating in my property seminar may significantly diverge in the
strength of their preferences for one writing topic over another.
28 2
But it would seem unacceptable for a student to hold such a strong
desire for a particular paper topic as to contemplate suicide if not
granted her wish. 28 3
The problem of unfair and objectionable preference intensities is
important, but should not be overstated. Obviously, we cannot forgo
consideration of preference-intensity for both efficiency and fairness
reasons.284 Because not all people's preferences can be satisfied and
some must be frustrated, a relevant-albeit not sole-consideration is
their relative strength. Although some individuals may possess an un-
usual propensity for intense preferences or an exceptional capacity to
enjoy any resource, it is reasonable to assume that most others hold
both strong and weak preferences and have a relatively similar ability
to experience utility. 285 Therefore, we should not throw the baby out
280 Preferences whose very content-regardless of their intensity-is offensive are
often referred to as "objectionable preferences." See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 21, at
1681-83. Legislatures often attempt to "weed out" antisocial preferences in a generalized
fashion, such as outlawing racial discrimination in housing or employment. SeeJoseph W.
Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standardsfor the Legal Frame-
work of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'v REV. 139, 149-50, 153-59 (2008)
(arguing that rejection of objectionable preferences should rest on the notion that a free
and democratic society entails minimum standards of decency and fairness and the treat-
ment of every person with equal respect).
281 Peter Vallentyne, The Problem of Unauthorized Welfare, 25 NoOs 295, 308 (1991)
("Supersensitive utility monsters are individuals who care excessively intensely about the differ-
ences between alternatives (e.g., where eating an apple rather than an orange gives a per-
son a million extra units of utility, but 'normal' individuals would only get at most a few
extra units of utility).").
282 For a discussion of this example in the context of the GNP identifier of "reasons,"
see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
283 1 encountered a less extreme example during my compulsory military service in the
Israeli Army. I interviewed would-be soldiers about their preferences regarding their up-
coming service. Most individuals ranked a few preferences and indicated their relative
intensity. Some, however, were adamant: "Either boss-driver or jail." In other words, if
they did not receive the one position they wanted-personal driver to a high-ranking of-
ficer-they would refuse doing anything else and instead choose to spend their military
service in the army prison. Even if these persons meant what they said, their preference-
intensity seems unreasonably excessive.
284 For an explanation why both efficiency and fairness require the consideration of
preference-intensities, see supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
285 See Goodin, supra note 41, at 316 (postulating that individuals have equal capacities
to experience happiness); Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 71-72 (explaining the assumption
that people possess equivalent capacities for satisfaction); see alsoJONATHAN BARON, THINK-
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with the bathwater, but rather seek identifiers that minimize the
problems of objectionable intensities. In addition, even assuming that
individuals have partial control over the shaping of their preferences,
the deliberate cultivation of high-intensity preferences has drawbacks.
For instance, by intentionally increasing the strength of one's desires,
one also self-enhances the frustration from subsequent nonfulfillment
of preferences. In a similar vein, a person who holds only (or mainly)
strong preferences would not be able to engage in logrolling, since
vote trading requires the existence of relatively weak preferences that
can be exchanged for more urgent ones. 28 6
It is worthwhile to note that the problem of excessive preference-
intensities differs from the more commonly discussed problem of expen-
sive preferences. An example of the latter is people who deliberately
cultivate a desire to drink champagne while others suffice with beer.
If the state aims at equality of welfare, it would consequently have to
spend a larger part of its limited resources in order to grant the cham-
pagne drinkers an equal level of well-being. This will reduce the
quantity-and fair share-of resources available for others.287 The
preference-intensity issue, in contrast, often arises with respect to the
allocation of the same or same type of asset. We must decide who
should receive a given entitlement, and its eventual allocation to the
person whose preferences are the most intense does not entail addi-
tional expenditures. Recall, for example, our discussion of rights of
redemption, self-help remedies, rights of first refusal, and adoption
entitlements. 288 Allocation of such rights to people with strong pref-
erences-rather than to people with weaker ones-does not involve
greater costs. An exception in this regard is compensation situa-
tions. 289 For example, if takings compensation recognizes owners'
subjectively high valuation of their land, then the state must spend
more on such persons from its limited budget. However (assuming
we can accurately estimate owners' true valuation), one gains nothing
from cultivating intense preferences with respect to the land: a land-
owner whose subjective loss from the taking is 500 will receive 500,
and an owner whose losses are twice as large-1000-will receive
1000. In other words, compensation (at most) offsets the genuine
subjective losses from the taking. A person who happens to have a
ING AND DECIDING 421-22 (4th ed. 2008) (stating that an assumption that people's margi-
nal utility functions are similar will maximize expected utility, if we do not know which
person has the greater ability to experience utility or who is a "utility monster").
286 See Wieting, supra note 231, at 95, 99.
287 See DWORKIN, supra note 278, at 48-59. Dworkin uses the problem of expensive
preferences to support his argument that the state should aim at equality of resources,
rather than equality of welfare. Id. at 58, 65-119.
288 See respectively, supra notes 153-68, 93-110, 62-81, 136-49 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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higher valuation has not thereby improved her relative position in any
way. 290
Following these general remarks, let us examine whether the five
identification methods can address the concern of unacceptable
intensities.
The three case-specific methods-Mouth, MP, and CSP-do not
contain any measure for curbing unfair and objectionable preference-
intensities. The Mouth technique accepts people's declared intensi-
ties as given. 291 Although MP and CSP methods require that individu-
als back up their preferences-statements with either monetary292 or
nonmonetary293 payments, both methods do not place any caps on
socially acceptable intensities. Admittedly, people's actual ability to
pay (in cash or in-kind) indirectly restrains their possibilities of realiz-
ing outrageous preference-intensifies. However, this limitation would
apply haphazardly, or unjustifiably favor the rich. 294
In contrast, generalized methods for identifying strong prefer-
ences-GNP and GP 295-can directly deal with inappropriate intensi-
ties simply by not applying to, or excluding, situations in which unfair
or objectionable intensities are likely to exist. Lawmakers can draft
the legal rule to include only unproblematic cases: ones that do not
encourage the cultivation of unjustifiable intensities, do not allocate
too many resources to people with strongly held preferences, and so
forth. Recall, for instance, our discussion of "possession" as a proxy
for intense preferences. Observation and experience support the con-
290 But see Wyman, supra note 42, at 270-71 (arguing, with respect to governmental
takings, that compensation of expensive tastes may create a moral hazard problem but
conceding that such a problem does not arise with respect to land bought for self-use and
that moral hazard may generally exist whenever compensation is set according to market
value).
291 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
292 For instance, through willingness to pay higher taxes. See supra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
293 For example, through readiness to trade their votes on weaker preferences for ad-
ditional votes on their strong preferences.
294 Note that although rich people with objectionable intensities may be able to afford
the extra payments required by MP, they will usually have no reason to reveal the full
extent of their outrageous intensity. They can report a lower self-assessment that they still
expect to be significantly higher than that of any other individual. See supra note 37 (dis-
cussing incentives to lie). Nonetheless, it is true that under MP, the richer a person is, the
greater her chances of realizing objectionably strong preferences. Although CSP is not
similarly biased in favor of the wealthy there is no correlation between the magnitude of
the preference's intensity and the value of the in-kind benefit that is sacrificed to realize it.
One can forego an identical benefit for the satisfaction of both objectionable and unobjec-
tionable intensities. Thus, the MP and CSP methods place no meaningful barriers in the
way of objectionable preference-intensities.
295 As explained above, although both methods employ generalizations that do not
require ad-hoc examination of specific cases, GNP identifiers do not penalize intense pref-
erences, whereas GP detects strong preferences through willingness to bear sanctions. See
supra notes 226, 227-29 and accompanying text.
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clusion that owners who were recently dispossessed of their property
have very strong preferences for immediate repossession of the prop-
erty, which justifies a self-help remedy.2 96 Nonpossessing owners usu-
ally hold significantly weaker preferences for immediate reclamation
of property, and therefore the advantages of preventing violence and
preserving the public peace override their preferences for self-help
privileges.2 97 Nonetheless, some nonpossessing owners may be out-
raged by learning about a trespass to their land even if occurring
thousands of miles away, and might strongly desire to fly over immedi-
ately to violently oust the trespasser. By crafting a rule that limits self-
help to possessors, the law bars the use of force by individuals with
objectionable preference-intensities. Another example is the employ-
ment of a "use value" identifier in the context of compensation for
takings. According to this identifier, owners using certain kinds of
land often have high subjective valuation of it and should receive
some fixed percentage above market value. 298 Such a rule determines
in advance the maximum percentage-for example, fifty percent-by
which compensation can exceed market prices. 299 One can see this as
setting the limits to the socially acceptable valuation of land. Al-
though some owners may indeed value their home at five hundred
percent of fair market value or even more, the GNP rule excludes the
satisfaction of inappropriately high or fetishistic preferences. 300
It is interesting to note that although the GNP identifier of "rea-
sons" is applied on a case-by-case basis, it shares this advantage of gen-
eralized identifiers, rather than the shortcoming of the case-specific
methods. By requiring reasons for preferences, we can not only de-
tect the existence of strong preferences, 30' but also flush out inappro-
priate intensities. A reasons-requirement is flexible and discretionary
enough to include a stipulation that only explarations that are indica-
tive of both the genuineness and minimal reasonableness of intensity
would pass the test.30 2
296 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
300 In a similar fashion, GP identifiers select, ex ante, scenarios in which strong prefer-
ences may legitimately exist, and offer people the opportunity to prove their truthfulness
by readiness to bear a cost.
301 See supra notes 173-75, 188-200 and accompanying text (explaining how requiring
reasons detects strong preferences with respect to allocation of seminar topics and exemp-
tion of conscientious objectors).
302 Cf Scanlon, supra note 277, at 659-661, 666 (advocating an inquiry into the rea-
sons for preferences in order to differentiate between objectively important preferences
and ones that are only subjectively so for the person holding them, and supporting grant-
ing priority to the former).
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F. Summary
The theoretical discussion above has demonstrated that GNP
identifiers of intense preferences enjoy many advantages that other
methods lack, either wholly or in part. GNP identifiers treat people
with dignity and respect, afford equal treatment to their preferences,
do not favor the rich, and at the same time mitigate the risk of lies.
Furthermore, GNP methods are capable of dealing with objectionable
preference-intensities and their implementation entails relatively low
costs. Table 2 below pulls all the threads together and summarizes the
conclusions of our comparative evaluation.
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSIONS
This Article explored the important issue of how to identify in-
tense preferences. It discussed several methods for detecting strong
preferences and analyzed their relative advantages and weaknesses.
The Article demonstrated that generalized and nonpenalizing de-
vices-which constitute the hidden common denominator of a great
variety of legal rules-are the superior identification method.
An important caveat is in order. I do not claim that generalized
and nonpenalizing identifiers can entirely replace Mouth and Purse
or other penalizing mechanisms for detecting intense preferences.
Generalized and nonpenalizing identifiers are feasible, for example,
whenever we can generalize that a certain proxy-such as use value,
possession, declining marginal utility, or redemption-succeeds in
capturing cases in which systematically high preference-intensities are
likely to be present. 30 3 In addition, GNP devices are especially suita-
303 In scenarios in which the existence of intense preferences is nonsystematic, but
rather random, one cannot generalize in advance which of the parties competing for an
entitlement would have the most intense preferences for it. For instance, we can use pos-
session as a proxy for intense preferences in various situations because possessing owners
usually have stronger preferences with respect to an asset than nonpossessing owners. See
supra Part II.B. In contrast, we could not have used this proxy in crafting legal rules if both
possessors and nonpossessors were equally likely to have intense preferences with respect
to the asset. In cases where strong intensity is haphazardly distributed, allocation of an
entitlement may involve the formidable task of interpersonally comparing the utility exper-
ienced by individuals. See ELSTER, supra note 136, at 218 (noting that information and
measurement problems may prevent us from carrying out interpersonal comparisons of
utility on a case-by-case basis); Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility
Comparisons, 104 MIND 473 (1995) (arguing that it is largely impossible to make interper-
sonal comparisons of utilities). But see R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD,
AND POINT 117-30 (1981) (discussing interpersonal comparisons of degrees or strengths of
preference); John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in UTILITARIAN-
ISM AND BEYOND 49-52 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (advocating a method
of "imaginative empathy" to enable interpersonal comparisons of utility). Economic analy-
sis and the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion bypass this problem by substituting utility with
money. Coddington, supra note 6, at 222-23. Accordingly, economic efficiency regards
the person who is willing to pay the most for an entitlement as the one whose preferences
for it are the strongest. POSNER, supra note 9, at 11, 13. As the literature widely acknowl-
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ble when all one needs is an affirmation that an intense preference
exists, or a relatively "rough" comparison between stronger and
weaker preferences, 30 4 rather than an exact quantification of the pref-
erences' strength. This may explain why the literature suggests MP
techniques with respect to compensation for takings of land. 30 5 In
compensation scenarios, ideally we seek the "magic number" that rep-
resents the individual's true valuation of an asset or the precise extent
of her losses. Notwithstanding, GNP identifiers-which compensate
landowners with high subjective valuation by granting them some
fixed percentage above market price 306-may be regarded as superior
even in this context. The relative crudeness of such a compensation
formula is offset by the many advantages of GNP devices, as explained
above. 30 7 Moreover, and beyond the takings sphere, the significant
shortcomings of penalizing identifiers have been ignored or down-
played, while the impressive advantages of GNP identifiers have been
overlooked in the theoretical literature. We should therefore expand
the use of GNP mechanisms and create additional rules that utilize
this technique.
Our analysis of GNP identifiers focused on their promise for de-
tecting intense preferences. GNP techniques, however, have further
beneficial implications. In closing, I would like to point out one such
example. The GNP method's value is not limited to detection of high
intensity preferences, but can be extended to low intensity preferences
as well. Specifically, proxies for exceptionally low valuation of entitle-
ments can also be incorporated into legal rules. A good example is
the proxy of "non-use." Both trademark law and rent-controlled hous-
ing rules hold that non-use of these rights leads to their loss. 30 8 This
edges, while "willingness to pay" eases measurement and comparisons between individuals,
it might be a poor proxy for utility. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD.
191, 199-201 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
303, 304, 308-14 (2007) (explaining why IATP is likely to be a crude proxy for welfare).
304 See also Harsanyi, supra note 303, at 49 ("In everyday life we make, or at least at-
tempt to make, interpersonal utility comparisons all the time. When we have only one nut
left at the end of a trip, we may have to decide which particular member of our family is in
greatest need of a little extra food. Again, we may give a book or a concert ticket or a free
invitation to a wine-tasting fair to one friend rather than to another in the belief that the
former would enjoy it more than the latter would.").
305 See supra Part I.
306 See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
307 See supra Part III. Alternatively, one could improve the accuracy of a GNP compen-
sation device by observing the results of an MP mechanism applied elsewhere. For in-
stance, a state interested in awarding landowners some fixed percentage above market value
could determine the appropriate bonus by examining the common or average percentage
above market price reported by self-assessing landowners in jurisdictions that adopt an MP
identifier.
308 2-3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 16:9, 17:5, 17:11 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining that ownership of a trademark requires
continuous use and that nonuse extinguishes the right); P.F. SMITH, EVANS & SMITH: THE
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outcome seems surprising at first glance since the liberty to use one's
property implies the freedom not to use it.309 Furthermore, intensive
use of a right imposes burdens on the people who must respect the
right and suffer the consequences of its use, whereas non-use of a
right entails the positive result of more freedom to others.310 Never-
theless, "non-use" is sometimes a reliable identifier of low-intensity
preferences. The value of entitlements may be intimately connected
with, and dependent on, their actual use. This is particularly true of
rights created for a specific, narrow purpose that cannot be unilater-
ally changed. The whole point of a trademark is its actual business-
related use: the identification of the source of goods and services. 311
Likewise, the sole objective of rent control is to supply affordable
housing to those who would otherwise be homeless. 31 2 Therefore, a
significant period of non-use may serve as an indicator of the low
value which owners place on their entitlements. 313 The absence of
self-relinquishment by right holders can be attributed to the costs of
affirmatively giving up rights, 3 14 or strategic behavior.3 15 By extin-
guishing unused rights of these types the law reduces the incidence of
low-valuing owners, while saving on the transaction costs associated
LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 271-77 (4th ed. 1993) (stating that tenants must reside in
the rent-controlled apartment or else forfeit their rights, and that succession by family
members also depends on the fulfillment of occupancy requirements).
309 Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1122, 1130 (1985) (claiming that an owner's fight to use his property as he wishes as
long as he does not injure others should also include the right to "ignore the property, if
by ignoring it he does not injure others").
310 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in Prop-
erty Law, 92 MINN. L. REv. 634, 641 (2008). In this Article, I generally discuss the phenome-
non that the law often affords less tolerance and more interference to moderate measures
relating to property (such as conditioned transfer, non-use, and modification) than to ex-
treme measures (such as total inalienability, intensive use, and destruction).
311 SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 1:1.1 (4th ed. 2003).
312 SeeW. DENNIS KEATING ET AL., RENT CONTROL: REGULATION AND THE RENTAL HOUS-
ING MARKET 3 (1998) (discussing the origins of rent control as an emergency measure to
deal with temporary housing shortages).
313 Non-use of land by its owner, in contrast, is not a good proxy for low valuation.
This is because ownership of land enables many potential and diverse enjoyments, some of
which may be realized only in the future. It may very well be the case that land is presently
unutilized because it is not yet ripe for development or because its owner is waiting for the
time when a better use can be made. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAWv 73-74 (2004). A use-it-or-lose-it rule might therefore create inefficient incen-
tives for premature development.
314 For instance, the time and money required to communicate the act of relinquish-
ment to all the relevant burdened parties and to the land registry (if it needs to erase a
formerly recorded fight).
315 Even if a right has no value to its holder, who does not intend ever to use it in the
future, the holder can utilize its very existence to extract gain from the party most heavily
burdened by the fight. For instance, the continuing existence of a rent-controlled tenancy
prevents the landlord from putting the vacant apartment to any other use and realizing its
full market value. Consequently, the tenant can hold on to her fight for "blackmailing"
purposes only. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 310, at 687-88.
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with freeing scarce resources for more efficient uses. Involuntary abo-
lition avoids dissipation of value through unnecessary negotiations as
well as the risk that such negotiations will fail.3 1 6 Once the role of a
"non-use" proxy is acknowledged, we can extend its employment to
additional scenarios. Accordingly-and contrary to current servitudes
law" 17-non-use of a servitude for a lengthy period of time should
lead to its loss.
Young Arthur was revealed as England's rightful king by a mira-
cle. Regrettably, the law cannot rely on miracles to discover prefer-
ence-intensities. Yet, the GNP method advocated in this Article shares
a common feature with the sword-in-the-stone: both are nonpenaliz-
ing devices. Mere verbal statements ("I am the one!"), willingness to
pay, force ("might makes right"), or readiness to bear nonmonetary
sanctions did not determine the identity of the true king. Arthur was
only required to perform-what was for him-a very simple task. It
was effortless for Arthur, but impossible for all others. 318 We would
do well to follow this example and adopt nonpenalizing identifiers
whenever possible.
316 Id. at 685-86, 688-91. Bilateral monopoly may hinder efficient transactions. When
there is only one seller and one buyer for a particular entitlement (as is the case when
negotiating a release from a rent-controlled tenancy) and the parties have imperfect infor-
mation about the other's true valuation, mutual attempts to capture the potential gains
from the trade may result in bargaining failure. SHAVELL, supra note 313, at 89-91 (discuss-
ing the role of information asymmetry in failures to reach mutually beneficial agreements
through negotiation).
317 Non-use alone ordinarily does not terminate servitudes. Termination requires
some additional factor, such as affirmative behavior that expresses the servitude owner's
intent to abandon her right. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND LICENSES IN LAND §§ 10:18-10:20 (2001 & Supp. 2007). Such is the case, for example,
if the servitude holder not only ceased to use her right of way, but also blocked the sole
access route permitting exercise of the servitude. Hatcher v. Chesner, 221 A.2d 305,
307-08 (Pa. 1966).
318 HOPINS, supra note 5, at 15-16, 18.
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